

Securing Your PeopleSoft Application Environment

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Introduction

This red paper is a practical guide for technical users, installers, system administrators, and programmers who implement, maintain, or develop applications for your PeopleSoft system. This red paper discusses guidelines on how to address the security of your implementation, including network infrastructure considerations, hardening of the PeopleSoft Internet Architecture and Portal, and other system-hardening configuration recommendations. This document doesn't cover the configuration of batch processes.

The information contained in this document originated from many sources, including industry research and knowledge, internal expertise, and Oracle Global Customer Support (GCS), and therefore contains "real-life" solutions and recommendations that have been implemented in the field. Because we can't address every security consideration that might be applicable to your specific implementation and environment, the items discussed in this document are intended to give a broad "recommended guidelines" baseline for securing an Oracle PeopleSoft environment. As such, many of the frequently asked questions we receive from the field are covered in this document.

Structure of This Red Paper

This red paper provides guidance in setting up security for Oracle PeopleSoft systems beyond application security. The intent of this document is to provide information about securing the overall infrastructure of a deployed PeopleSoft system.

Oracle updates this document as needed so that it reflects the most current feedback from the field. Therefore, the structure, headings, content, and length of this document may vary with each posted version. To see if the document has been updated since you last downloaded it, compare the date of your version to the date of the version that is posted on My Oracle Support.

Related Materials

This paper is not a general introduction to environment tuning and is written for experienced IT professionals with a good understanding of the PeopleSoft Internet Architecture. To take full advantage of the information in this document, you should have a basic understanding of system administration, basic Internet architecture, integration technologies, relational database concepts and SQL, and how to use PeopleSoft applications.

PeopleTools Documentation

This document does not replace the PeopleTools 8.5x product documentation. Before you read this document, you should become familiar with the PeopleSoft Internet Architecture and PeopleSoft security administration information in the PeopleTools product documentation to ensure that you have a well-rounded understanding of the technology.

Note. Much of the information in this document may eventually be incorporated into subsequent versions of the product documentation.

The following product documentation discusses many of the fundamental concepts that are related to the PeopleSoft Internet Architecture:

- » PeopleTools: Getting Started with PeopleTools
- » PeopleTools: System and Server Administration
- » PeopleTools: PeopleSoft Application Designer Developer's Guide
- » PeopleTools: Security Administration
- » PeopleTools: PeopleSoft Integration Broker
- » PeopleTools: PeopleSoft Integration Broker Administration
- » PeopleTools: PeopleCode API Reference
- » PeopleTools Installation for your database platform
- » PeopleTools Hardware and Software Requirements

Additionally, you should be familiar with the documentation that is delivered with Oracle Tuxedo, Jolt, and WebLogic.

Additional Resources

The following table lists additional resources:

Resource	Location
"PeopleTools CPU Analysis and Supported Versions of PeopleTools"	https://blogs.oracle.com/peopletools/entry/peopletools_cpu_analysis_and_supported
PeopleTools Version End of Support/Life and PeopleTools Support for Applications"	https://blogs.oracle.com/peopletools/entry/peopletools_version_end_of_life
PeopleSoft Technology and Security	https://www.youtube.com/user/PeopleSoftTechnology



Chapter 1: Overview

This red paper discusses guidelines on how to address the security of your PeopleSoft implementation, including network infrastructure considerations, hardening of the PeopleSoft Internet Architecture and PeopleSoft Interaction Hub, and other system-hardening configuration recommendations.

This section includes the following topics:

- » Who should read this paper?
- » Before you begin.

Who Should Read This Paper?

This paper is not a general introduction to environment tuning, and we assume that our readers are experienced IT professionals, with a good understanding of the PeopleSoft internet architecture. To take full advantage of the information covered in this document, we recommend that you have a basic understanding of system administration, internet architecture, relational database concepts, SQL, and how to use PeopleSoft applications.

Before You Begin

A number of books, publications, and white papers on security are available that a security administrator should consult to get a comprehensive understanding of how to secure a site.

At a minimum, please download and read *Common Sense Guide for Senior Managers: Top Ten Recommended Information Security Practices*, published by the Internet Security Alliance. See <http://bit.ly/2bN0Ufy>

This document provides information that is an excellent starting point for security administrators to ensure that basic security policies and practices are observed within an organization before any PeopleSoft-specific security is put into place. The document identifies ten of the highest-priority and most-frequently recommended security practices as a place to start for today's operational systems. These practices address dimensions of information security such as policy, process, people, and technology, all of which are necessary for deployment of a successful security process.

Each organization is responsible for determining where to position itself on this exponential curve (a symbolic reference to the full spectrum of "dimensions of information security") and what amount of security investment they need to make to achieve a satisfactory level of security within the system. A satisfactory level of security also depends on the business goals of the security system. These considerations lead us to the need to create a security model targeted to address security threats and their business impact.



Chapter 2: Understanding Security Policies, Models, and Strategies

This chapter discusses security policies, models and strategies.

Introduction

When it comes to information security, there are no silver bullets—no single process, technology, or certification that will guarantee 100-percent safety. Industry best practices dictate that an organization uses a combination of processes and technologies that mitigate risk and limit damage.

Security comprises three main areas: planning, prevention, and response. Without a plan, your company will not be well-prepared to repel attacks and deal with intrusions. Techniques and tools targeted at prevention should be where most of your energy and funding are directed. In the event that prevention fails, you must be ready to respond quickly and masterfully.

Keeping this in mind, the first step in securing a PeopleSoft environment is to create a security model for your site at the enterprise or organizational level. You can create a new model, or align your PeopleSoft security implementation strategy with your existing security model.

One of the most common errors that an organization can make when deploying new services, systems, and technologies is failing to align security capabilities with business objectives. Your organization should develop or leverage a security model that manages the inherent trade-offs between enablement and protection of an enterprise's most valuable resource—its information assets.

Understanding Security Policies and Security Models

A *security policy* captures the security requirements of an organization or describes the steps that an organization must take to achieve security.

A *security model* is a formal description of a security policy. Organizations use security models to evaluate security, and sometimes for proof of security.

Current wisdom has identified three widely accepted pillars of security:

Computer Security Use risk assessment, apply the CIA taxonomy (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability), use non-repudiation, and authentication, apply new goals, and apply extended enterprise planning models.

Physical Security Integrate physical access systems with network authorization systems.

Trustworthy People Know to whom you give access. Apply due diligence.



Understanding Common Security Models

Many security models are available that an organization can apply in an effort to meet the security criteria. This section highlights several common security models.

CIA Security Model

The classic security model followed by many organizations is what has come to be known as the *CIA Model*. This model focuses on the *confidentiality*, *integrity*, and *availability* aspects of security.

Many in the security industry would state that these core tenets are the ultimate goal of information security. However, this approach may not address other considerations.

Forged in the early days of the internet's commercialization, the classic CIA approach also took on authentication, access control, and non-repudiation as goals in the mid-1990s. Since then, this model has become standard security fare. But this goal-oriented approach neglects today's critical security needs, where attacks are more sophisticated and frequent and come from a wider range of sources.

For example, the traditional architecture for implementing the CIA model—the firewall-based perimeter—is increasingly ineffective. Worse still, the goal-oriented approach doesn't address the other half of good security planning: risk assessment. Risk assessment, which guides security managers in prioritizing security spending, is sorely neglected even in organizations that acknowledge its importance.

The CIA model is a good foundation to achieve a high level of security. Other security goals should be risk assessment and the creation of a modified version of a *demilitarized zone* (DMZ) perimeter. Critical, too, is the need to recognize new goals as they emerge.

Strategic Business Process Security Model

Many security consulting organizations have devised a security model that identifies security as a strategic business process. The business model includes the enterprise, the processes, and the technologies that enable access to, and protection of, an enterprise's information assets.

This comprehensive security model illustrates how to identify, create, capture, and sustain the value of security in an organization by managing the inherent trade-offs between enablement and protection of an enterprise's most valuable resource—its information assets.

In this model, these primary security activities are driven by business objectives and carried out in alignment with the enterprise's supporting capabilities—its organization (people), robust processes, and technology infrastructure. This type of model centers on how security adds value to an organization. A security model of this nature is specifically designed to function as a road map. It helps an organization navigate the process of building a scalable and sustainable security infrastructure that both protects and enables access to critical business and information assets in alignment with strategic business objectives and appropriately balanced and associated costs.

VEN Security Model

The Burton Group has developed a security model commonly referred to as the *Virtual Extended Network* (VEN) model. The goal-oriented CIA model, discussed previously, often results in what many industry analysts call a "tootsie pop" syndrome, that is, a security model that results in a hard shell with a soft chewy center infrastructure. The CIA model can produce significant security weakness, especially in light of the pervasiveness of web-enabled applications and systems. Allowing users to do anything possible once they're inside is no longer sufficient.

The VEN model is an alternative to the traditional DMZ. It consists of four layers that represent different techniques for different zones of use:



Specifically, the VEN model defines four logical layers: the resource layer, which houses clients, servers, applications and data; the control layer, where authentication services reside, as do controls for security policies across layers; the perimeter layer, which defines an organization's physical boundaries and contains firewalls, proxies, and gateways; and the extended perimeter, where companies engage technologies or services to secure resources that are physically located outside the perimeter. The result is a model that builds on the existing infrastructure, but plans for a distributed perimeter.

Conclusion

Security is an integration of people, processes, and technology. Rather than being merely a technology fix, security must now be defined in a way that incorporates the critical roles and interdependence that exist between an organization's people, its firm processes, and its technology infrastructure. Leveraging a clearly defined security model will enable your organization to address these issues in combination, resulting in a PeopleSoft environment that provides a world-class security posture.

The security model is essential to create critical requirements that support a secure enterprise. The success of these initiatives, however, hinges on several critical requirements, with profound implications for any organization:

- » Technology resources are connected and available to the appropriate users.
- » Checks and balances exist to ensure appropriate access and approvals.
- » Perimeter protection and monitoring are assured.
- » The supporting infrastructure:
 - » Is resilient under variable circumstances.
 - » Is reliable under all conditions.
 - » Performs.
 - » Scales.
 - » Supports interoperability.
 - » Is efficiently maintained.

This document does not provide a lengthy discussion about security models and how to develop and implement them, but it is critical to understand that the securing of your PeopleSoft environment should be done in alignment with your enterprise security policies. Those policies should be created from the foundation based upon the security model that you've established. Securing your PeopleSoft environment should not be a one-off solution, but rather a comprehensive approach taken in concert with overall corporate security policies, guidelines, and business requirements.

Security Assessment

To secure a site or organization, the first thing to know is where the security threats exist, how these threats are exploited, and what the financial ramifications are for each of the threats.

The primary step in addressing security threats is to conduct and periodically repeat an information security risk evaluation that identifies your critical information assets (for example, systems, networks, and data), threats to critical assets, asset vulnerabilities, and risks.



A security assessment should include the following tasks:

- » Identify the adverse impact when risks to critical assets are exploited, including financial, reputation, market position, time and productivity, and so on.
- » Quantify the financial impact to the greatest extent possible.
- » Develop and implement a risk mitigation plan resulting from the evaluation, and keep it updated.
- » Ensure that there are regular review and management of the risks to critical information assets.

A critical part of addressing security threats is to identify and properly secure the systems deployed within your infrastructure and organization. This security assessment enables you to create a list of security vulnerabilities for the deployed software and hardware. An additional resource for identifying known vendor-specific vulnerabilities and the associated patches or remediation is available at <http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/>.

Create a list of all vendors, including PeopleSoft, who have supplied software and hardware for the deployed system. Then for each vendor and their hardware, software, or both, create a list of known vulnerabilities. This list provides a list of known issues and security concerns, and at a minimum these should be addressed. This might include applying patches, identifying workarounds, and implementing them during deployment.

The list of known vulnerabilities and the results of the security assessment will provide your organization with a remediation road map for improving the security posture of your PeopleSoft environment. It is crucial to actually implement the fixes, patches, and recommended security infrastructure improvements. In many cases, significant improvements in overall security can be achieved with minimal levels of effort (man-hours) or costs. In short, action is a requirement. Failure to implement remediations or address discovered vulnerabilities and risks will leave your entire infrastructure at risk.

Devising and Implementing an Enterprise Security Strategy

Your security policies and security model should become components of your organization's overall security strategy.

This section discusses the "defense in-depth" security strategy.

Understanding the Defense in Depth Security Strategy

Defense in depth is a practical strategy for achieving information security (often called *information assurance*) in today's highly networked environments. It is a best practices strategy in that it relies on the intelligent application of techniques and technologies that exist today. The strategy recommends a balance between the protection capability and cost, performance, and operational considerations. Your security strategy should also consider business continuance as it relates to the possible detrimental effects from non-malicious events, such as fire, flood, power outages, and so forth.

The defense in depth approach builds mutually supporting layers of defense to reduce vulnerabilities and to assist an enterprise in its efforts to protect against, detect, and react to as many attacks as possible. The construction of mutually supporting layers of defense inhibits the ability of an adversary who penetrates or breaks down one defensive layer to promptly encounter another, and another, until the attack is ultimately thwarted.

To protect against different attack methods, it is important to employ corresponding security measures. The weakness of one security measure should be compensated for by the strength of another.

Characterizing Potential Threats

To effectively resist attacks against its information and information systems, an organization needs to characterize its adversaries, their potential motivations, and their classes of attack. Potential adversaries might include nation states, terrorists, criminal elements, hackers, or corporate competitors. Their motivations might include intelligence



gathering, theft of intellectual property, denial of service, embarrassment, or just pride in exploiting a notable target. Their classes of attack might include passive monitoring of communications, active network attacks, close-in attacks, exploitation of insiders, and attacks through the industry providers of information technology resources.

The goal of implementing a security model is to provide information security and protection (assurance). This goal is realized when information and information systems are protected against such attacks through the application of security services discussed previously in the chapter, such as availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. The application of these services should be based on a Protect, Detect, and React paradigm. This means that in addition to incorporating protection mechanisms, organizations should expect attacks and employ attack detection tools and procedures that enable them to react to and recover from these attacks.

Achieving Information Assurance

An important principle of the defense in depth strategy is that achieving information assurance requires a balanced focus on three primary elements: people, technology, and operations.

People Achieving information assurance begins with a commitment by senior management (typically at the chief information officer level) based on a clear understanding of the perceived threat. This must be followed through with effective information assurance policies and procedures, assignment of roles and responsibilities, commitment of resources, training of critical personnel (for example, users and system administrators), and personal accountability. This includes the establishment of physical security and personnel security measures to control and monitor access to facilities and critical elements of the information technology environment.

Technology Today, a wide range of technologies is available for providing information assurance services and for detecting intrusions. To ensure that the right technologies are procured and deployed, an organization should establish effective policies and processes for technology acquisition. These should include a security policy, information assurance principles, system-level information assurance architectures and standards, criteria for needed information assurance products, acquisition of products that have been validated by a reputable third party, configuration guidance, and processes for assessing the risk of the integrated systems.

Operations The operations element focuses on all the activities required to sustain an organization's security posture on a day-to-day basis. These include:

- » Maintaining visible and up-to-date system-security policy.
- » Certifying and accrediting changes to the information technology baseline.
- » Managing the security posture of the information assurance technology.
- » Providing key management services and protecting the infrastructure.
- » Performing system security assessments.
- » Monitoring and reacting to current threats.
- » Incident response.
- » Disaster recovery and business continuity.

Considerations for Implementing a Defense in Depth Security Strategy

The key aspects of defense-in-depth are that it's layered, comprehensive, tested and proven, flexible rather than brittle, and requires knowledge and skill. While anticipating every contingency isn't possible, developing a well-rounded information security plan can help to dissuade all but the most determined attackers. With proper auditing systems such as audit logs, intrusion detection systems, and other mechanisms, incident response staff will have



the right tools to determine what happened should a successful attack occur. Finally, note that maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information requires significant resources, time, and money. Security is not something that can be dropped in place and forgotten.

Securing your PeopleSoft environment requires you to implement a combination of security mechanisms and controls. These security mechanisms and controls will touch on many facets of the PeopleSoft environment. Be sure to address the following areas:

- » Organization Security:
 - » Security strategy.
 - » Organizational awareness.
 - » Internal threat profiling.
- » Operations Security:
 - » Security policy.
 - » Recurring assessments.
- » Infrastructure Security:
 - » Network architecture, design, and implementation.
 - » Network vulnerability assessment.
 - » Operating systems, storage, and wireless security.
 - » Penetration testing.
- » Application Security:
 - » Application architecture, design, and implementation.
 - » Application penetration testing.
 - » Secure software methodologies for internally developed software or modification to commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) applications.
 - » Product assessments.

Chapter 3: Securing the Network Infrastructure

This chapter discusses various network hardware and virtual components used for secure PeopleSoft systems. Instead of covering all possible configurations and devices, this chapter addresses systems that apply to PeopleSoft architecture and that have been tested in the field. The discussion is also limited to security configuration only; scalability and high-availability configurations are discussed in the [Implementing Clustering and High Availability for PeopleSoft Red Paper](#) (Doc ID 612096.1) located on the Oracle Support web site.

Securing Network Infrastructure Components

This section describes security considerations for your network infrastructure.

Routers

Most routers also have certain firewall capability, such as packet filtering, port blocking, and so on. These features should be enabled for added security whenever possible.

Customers using co-location will generally not have access to the router because this is part of the co-location provider's equipment. In these cases, all security features must be implemented within the system using additional equipment including firewalls, load balancer network address translation (NAT), reverse proxy server, and so on.

Firewalls

The firewall is one of the most common network devices used to secure a network environment. A firewall can be a logical or a physical device. The logical version of a firewall can be a combination of routers, load balancers, and switches working together to create a secure network. A physical firewall device can be special software running on commodity hardware, or it can be a dedicated hardware device.

In the following sections, a three-pronged firewall is used to discuss and illustrate network infrastructure security concepts and recommendations. In this configuration, the firewall has three interfaces: one for internet, one for intranet, and one for the demilitarized zone (DMZ) services. This configuration has a single point-of-protection (security failure) limitation for the intranet site. If this is not acceptable, the three-pronged firewall should be preceded with another pair of redundant firewalls. It is possible to run load balancers to distribute load among identical firewall units (firewall load balancing system) for greater scalability, but the configuration is not simple. Implementing the three-pronged firewall with redundancy will require six extra load balancers and six extra switches/virtual LANs to implement.

Load Balancers

A load balancer is highly recommended for achieving high scalability and fault tolerance at a reasonable cost. Most units can be configured to replace a firewall and provide hardware SSL acceleration. This provides some amount of security and scalability at a reasonable cost. On most load balancers, each physical unit can be configured into multiple logical units. These logical units may have separate network interfaces and can be placed in various network topologies. Security administrators will most often not allow a single physical device to be configured for more than one security zone.

Reverse Proxy Servers

Reverse proxy servers (RPSs) are most often used as part of a security infrastructure. Most sites deploy them to prevent internet IP packets from reaching production web servers directly. This is a security device for inbound HTTP(S) PIA traffic. An RPS provides protection from attacks that are launched to take advantage of vulnerability such as buffer overflow, malformed packets, and so on. It also adds another tier to the security architecture. Other



sites may use them as a single sign-on portal server; one that allows RPS-authenticated users to access multiple internal systems with varying authentication schemes without individual authentication to those systems.

Multiple RPSs are required for redundancy and in some cases for scalability. When multiple RPSs are deployed, a load balancer must be used in front of the RPS cluster. For PeopleSoft applications, a site domain name mapping will map to the load balancer for the RPS. For instance, an example site, *portal.corp.com*, should be mapped to a Virtual IP (VIP) 123.123.123.100 by external DNS systems and this VIP should be mapped to the RPS load balancer.

Forward Proxy Servers

Forward proxy servers, or proxy servers, are mostly used as part of a client security and caching infrastructure. Most sites deploy them to prevent users from connecting to the internet directly. This is a security device for outbound HTTP(S) PIA traffic. The user's browser connects to a proxy server that is either configured in the browser or transparently routed to a router. The proxy does the actual communication with the web server on behalf of the user. The proxy also can cache content to improve performance and to log all browsing history for audit purposes.

In the case in which a site deploys either PeopleSoft Integration Broker or PeopleSoft Interaction Hub ¹ and communicates with servers outside the production environment, a (forward) proxy server should be used. The production firewall should be configured to allow only the proxy server to connect outside the firewall. The proxy is therefore the only means of communicating with the outside world from within the production environment. All HTTP(S) requests originating from PeopleSoft servers should be routed via the proxy server.

Servers

Servers have a number of security settings and vulnerability issues associated with them. At a minimum, all vendor-provided operating system security patches should be applied to the servers. Additionally, all unused services should be disabled on the servers. This is explained in detail later in this red paper.

Web servers and application servers should also use dual network interfaces so that they can reside in separate subnets. This provides additional level security layers. The merits of having a different subnet for each layer can create complicated router policies that are required for administering servers in different subnets. Additionally, certain security failures on the web server might expose sensitive data even if the security of the application server and the database server has not been compromised.

DNS Servers

A PeopleSoft production system should avoid using DNS name resolution whenever possible. Instead, it should use statically configured server addresses. It may be necessary, however, for PeopleSoft Integration Broker or PeopleSoft Interaction Hub to be able to access remote servers. In this case, an entry in the hosts file (a file used to map IP addresses to host names) is not practical and some DNS lookup may be necessary. Under no circumstances should the local DNS servers be allowed to receive DNS updates from remote servers. The local DNS server should also be prevented from sending DNS queries to a remote server for local addresses. The local DNS server should only query the remote server for addresses that are outside the local domain of the site.

Virtual IPs (VIPs)

VIPs are not physical devices. They are IP addresses where users point their browsers to access a service. These IP addresses could point to a real web server in the simplest case. In most of the systems described in this document, they will point to a logical service implemented using firewalls, load balancers, proxy servers, and real

¹ Formerly known as PeopleSoft Enterprise Portal, the product name was changed to PeopleSoft Applications Portal in 2012 and then to PeopleSoft Interaction Hub in 2013.



servers. A VIP is also the IP address that the site's DNS name maps to. For instance, an example site, *portal.corp.com*, is mapped to a VIP 123.123.123.100 by external DNS systems.

Private Non-routable Address (RFC 1918)

Private non-routable addresses are IP addresses in the range 10.0.0.0–10.255.255.255, 172.16.0.0–172.31.255.255, and 192.168.0.0–192.168.255.255. These IP addresses work within a network and all addresses within the network are addressable internal hosts and routers. These addresses are not addressable from the internet, and internet routers will not be able to route packets to these IP addresses. Having a private IP address provides some security by isolating the internal servers from the outside world, but does not preclude the need for a firewall.

Public Address

Almost all IP addresses that are not within the range mentioned in RFC 1918 are publicly addressable. These are IP addresses that can be addressed and routed over the internet. Public addresses are required to expose services to internet user.

Network Address Translation (NAT)

Network address translation (NAT) enables a local-area network (LAN) to use private non-routable IP addresses for internal traffic and public addresses for external traffic.

A NAT device located where the LAN meets the internet makes all necessary IP address translations to packets moving from one address space to another. NAT provides some level of security by providing stateful inspection and by isolating the internal servers from the outside world. PIA uses HTTP(S) only and has no problems with NAT. Some network software, such as IPSec, Kerberos, and so on requires end-to-end packet-level integrity and will not work with NAT. In some of these cases, for example, for IPSec, performing NAT for security alone is not needed. Also, the use of NAT does not preclude the need for a firewall.

Additional Network Protection Systems and Technologies

This section discusses additional network systems and technologies, including:

- » Intrusion detection systems.
- » Intrusion prevention systems.
- » Intrusion detection and prevention systems.
- » Web application firewalls.
- » Unified threat management systems.
- » Access control systems.
- » Oracle Adaptive Access Manager.

There are multiple vendor and industry sources for information on these hardware protection mechanisms. The information here has been sourced from [Wikipedia](#).

Intrusion Detection Systems

An *intrusion detection system* (IDS) is a device or application that monitors network and system activities for malicious activities or policy violations, and produces reports to a management station.

Intrusion prevention is the process of performing intrusion detection and attempting to stop detected possible incidents.

Though they both relate to network security, an intrusion detection system (IDS) differs from a firewall in that a firewall looks outwardly for intrusions to stop them from happening. Firewalls limit access between networks to



prevent intrusion and do not signal an attack from inside the network. An IDS evaluates a suspected intrusion once it has taken place and signals an alarm. An IDS also watches for attacks that originate from within a system. This is traditionally achieved by examining network communications, identifying heuristics and patterns (often known as signatures) of common computer attacks, and taking action to alert operators.

With these systems, the intrusion sensor detects a potential security breach, logs the information, and signals an alert on the console and or owner.

IDS systems are sometimes referred to as passive systems.

Intrusion Prevention Systems

An IPS is typically designed to operate completely invisibly on a network. IPS products do not typically claim an IP address on the protected network but may respond directly to any traffic in a variety of ways. (Common IPS responses include dropping packets, resetting connections, generating alerts, and even quarantining intruders.) While some IPS products can implement firewall rules, this is often a mere convenience and not a core function of the product. Moreover, IPS technology offers deeper insight into network operations providing information about overly active hosts, bad logons, inappropriate content, and many other network and application layer functions.

An IPS system responds to the suspicious activity by resetting the connection or by reprogramming the firewall to block network traffic from the suspected malicious source. This can happen automatically or at the command of an operator. IPS systems are sometimes referred to as reactive systems.

Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems

Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) are primarily focused on identifying possible incidents, logging information about them, attempting to stop them, and reporting them to security administrators. In addition, organizations use IDPSs to identify problems with security policies, document existing threats, and to deter individuals from violating security policies. IDPSs have become a necessary addition to the security infrastructure of nearly every organization.

IDPSs typically record information related to observed events, notify security administrators of important observed events, and produce reports. Many IDPSs can also respond to a detected threat by attempting to prevent it from succeeding. They use several response techniques, which involve the IDPS stopping the attack itself, changing the security environment (for example, reconfiguring a firewall), or changing the attack's content.

Application Firewalls

An application firewall is a form of firewall that controls any combination of input, output, and access from, to, or by an application or service. It operates by monitoring and potentially blocking the input, output, or system service calls that do not meet the configured policy of the firewall. The application firewall is typically built to monitor one or more specific applications or services (such as a web or database service), unlike a stateful network firewall, which can provide some access controls for nearly any kind of network traffic.

Application firewalls are a very different type of technology than intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems.



An application firewall uses proxies to perform firewall access control for network and application-layer traffic. Some application-layer firewalls can do some IPS-like functions, such as enforcing RFC specifications on network traffic. Also, some application layer firewalls have also integrated IPS-style signatures into their products to provide real-time analysis and blocking of traffic. Application firewalls do have IP addresses on their ports and are directly addressable. Moreover, they use full proxy features to decode and reassemble packets. Not all IPSs perform full proxy-like processing. Also, application-layer firewalls tend to focus on firewall capabilities, with IPS capabilities as add-on. While numerous similarities between the two technologies exist, they are not identical and are not interchangeable.

Two primary categories of application firewalls exist: network-based application firewalls and host-based application firewalls. Application firewalls that are specific to a particular kind of network traffic may be titled with the service name, such as a web application firewall. They can be implemented through software running on a host or a standalone piece of network hardware. Often, it is a host using various forms of proxy servers to proxy traffic before passing it on to the client or server. Because it acts on the application layer, it may inspect the contents of the traffic, blocking specified content, such as certain websites and viruses, and it attempts to exploit known logical flaws in client software.

Network-Based Application Firewalls

Network-based application-layer firewalls work on the application level of the network stack (for example, all web browser, telnet, or ftp traffic), and can intercept all packets traveling to or from an application. In principle, application firewalls can prevent all unwanted outside traffic from reaching protected machines.

Modern application firewalls can also offload encryption from servers, block application input and output from detected intrusions or malformed communication, manage or consolidate authentication, or block content that violates policies.

Unified Threat Management Systems

Unified Threat Management (UTM) products, sometimes called next generation firewalls, bring together multiple security capabilities onto a single platform. A typical UTM platform provides firewall, VPN, antivirus, web filtering, intrusion prevention, and anti-spam capabilities. Some UTM appliances are derived from IPS products such as 3Com's X-series products. Others are derived from a combination with firewall products, such as Juniper's SSG or Cisco's Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA). And still others were derived from the ground up as a UTM appliance such as Netasq, SonicWALL, Fortinet, Calyptix, GajShield, and Astaro.

The main feature of a UTM is that it includes multiple security features on one appliance. As a comparison, IPS is merely one feature.

Access Control Systems

Access control refers to general rules allowing hosts, users, or applications access to specific parts of a network. Typically, access control helps organizations segment networks and limit access. While an IPS can block access to users, hosts, or applications, it does so only when malicious code has been discovered. As such, IPS does not necessarily serve as an access control device. While it has some access control abilities, firewalls and network access control (NAC) technologies are better suited to provide these features.



Oracle Adaptive Access Manager

Oracle Adaptive Access Manager provides superior protection for businesses and their customers through real-time fraud prevention, multifactor authentication, and unique authentication strengthening. Oracle Adaptive Access Manager consists of two primary components that together create one of the most powerful and flexible weapons in the war against fraud. Adaptive Strong Authenticator provides multifactor authentication and protection mechanisms for sensitive information such as passwords, PINs, security questions, account numbers, and other credentials.

Adaptive Risk Manager provides real-time and offline risk analysis and proactive actions to prevent fraud at critical logon and transaction checkpoints. Adaptive Risk Manager examines and profiles a large number of contextual data points to dynamically determine the level of risk during each unique logon and transaction attempt. Oracle Adaptive Access Manger strengthens and complements other identity and access management products such as single sign-on, federation, and fine-grained authorization with its unique security capabilities. Open frameworks and multiple deployment options ensure ease of integration for superior interoperability.

Creating Network Disaster Recovery Plans

All installations regardless of size must create a disaster recovery plan.

The disaster recovery plan must include processes and procedures to address and recover from security failures, standard power failures, physical disasters, and other outages.

For highly secure installations, the disaster recovery plan should include the creation of a second data center that is also part of a separate physical security zone. This means separate network security policies, access codes or badges, and security administrators.

A full discussion of disaster recovery planning is outside the scope of this document.

Chapter 4: Securing the PeopleSoft Internet Architecture

Once the infrastructure is secure, PeopleSoft Internet Architecture needs to be secured.

This chapter discusses considerations for how to:

- » Apply web server hardening.
- » Configure HTTPs on web servers.
- » Disable HTTP on web servers.
- » Change the default keystore password.
- » Disable configuration reinitialization.
- » Prohibit unregistered content.
- » Authorize resource access using Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS).
- » Disable browser caching for applications deployed in a kiosk environment.
- » Configure forward proxy servers for the portal and integration gateway when using a firewall.
- » Bypass forward proxies for local hosts.
- » Enable mutual authentication for integration.
- » Use FTPs and SSH protocols.
- » Encrypt the integration gateway properties file password.
- » Enable LDAPs for directory integration.
- » Disable anonymous BIND on LDAP.
- » Enable Tuxedo encryption.
- » Use ASO Encryption (Oracle Database)

Applying Web Server Hardening

This section discusses web server hardening for WebLogic and WebSphere web servers.

WebLogic Web Server Hardening

If you have deployed an Oracle WebLogic J2EE server, take the following steps to harden the installation:

- » Follow Oracle's recommendations for hardening WebLogic described in the Oracle Fusion Middleware Online Documentation Library for 11g Release (11.1.1.3.0) WebLogic Server documentation.
See "Security," Securing a Production Environment, *Ensuring the Security of Your Production Environment*, Securing the WebLogic Server Host contain
See http://download.oracle.com/docs/cd/E14571_01/wls.htm
- » Change the WebLogic server user's password.
See the product documentation for *PeopleTools 8.55: System and Server Administration*, "Working with Oracle WebLogic," Changing WebLogic User Passwords.
- » Restrict access to a servlet.
See the product documentation for *PeopleTools 8.55: System and Server Administration*, "Working with Oracle WebLogic," Securing Servlets on WebLogic.

WebSphere Web Server Hardening

If you have deployed a WebSphere J2EE server, use the recommendations on the IBM web site to harden the installation.



See <http://publib-b.boulder.ibm.com/abstracts/sg246451.html?Open>

Configuring HTTPs on Web Servers

At a minimum, apply HTTPs on web servers as a level of security for PeopleSoft Internet Architecture.

PeopleBooks discusses enabling SSL on WebLogic and WebSphere web servers.

See the product documentation for *PeopleTools 8.55: Integration Broker Administration*, “Setting Up Secure Integration Environments,” Installing Web Server-Based Digital Certificates.

Disabling HTTP on Web Servers

To disable HTTP on a web server, you must modify settings in the web profile in the PeopleSoft Internet Architecture and also on the web server.

Modifying the Web Profile

To modify the web profile to disable HTTP on a web server:

1. In PIA, navigate to PeopleTools, Web Profile, Web Profile Configuration.
2. Select the web profile that you want to configure; for example, *PROD*.
3. Select the Security tab.
4. Select Secured Access Only.
5. Save your changes.

Configuring the Web Server

After you make the changes to the web profile in PIA described in the previous section, you must make configuration changes on the web server. This section provides instructions for making these changes on WebLogic and WebSphere web servers. Before you attempt the procedures in this section ensure that HTTPs is set up and working properly using the instructions previously described in the *Configuring Web Server HTTPs* section of this chapter.

Disabling HTTP on WebLogic Web Servers

To disable HTTP on WebLogic:

1. Log on to the WebLogic console.
2. On the left panel, expand PeopleSoft, Server, PIA.
3. On the right panel, select Configuration, General tab.
4. Clear the Listen Port Enabled check box.
5. Select Apply.

Disabling HTTP on WebSphere Web Servers

In WebSphere, you can disable HTTP by converting an HTTP port into an HTTPs port.

To disable HTTP on WebSphere:

1. Log on to the WebSphere web server.
2. Expand Servers, Application Server, *server_name*, Web Container, HTTP Transport.
3. Click the relevant HTTP port.

5. Select the Enable SSL check box.
6. Select the SSL drop-down arrow that is tied to the certificates.
7. Save the configuration and log off.
8. Restart the WebSphere server.

Changing the Default Keystore Password

PSKEY is a keystore file located in the <PS_HOME>\webserv*domain*\keystore directory. The file contains all root and node certificates used by the integration gateway and PIA. The keystore file is shipped with a default password of *password*, which must be changed. Use a combination of uppercase and lowercase letters and numbers in the password.

To change the default password:

1. Access the PSKeyManager utility:
 - a. Select Start, Run.
 - b. Enter *cmd* in the Run field and press the Enter key.
 - c. At the prompt navigate to the following location:
 <PS_CFG_HOME>\pt*<DOMAIN>*\webserv\peoplesoft\piabin
2. Enter the following command and hit the ENTER key:
`pskeymanager -create`
3. Change the default keystore password.

For each prompt listed in the table, take the action shown:

Prompt	Action
Enter your current keystore password [press ENTER to quit]:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enter password. 2. Press the ENTER key.
You just entered the default password, are you sure the keystore is still using the default (yes, no, quit) [yes]?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enter Yes. 2. Press the ENTER key.
Enter your current keystore password [press ENTER to quit]:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enter Yes. 2. Press the ENTER key.
Enter a new keystore password [press ENTER to quit]:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enter your new password. 2. Press the ENTER key.
Reenter your new keystore password to confirm [press ENTER to quit]:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enter your new password again. 2. Press the ENTER key.

PSKeyManager writes the password to the keystore. The path to the keystore is shown at the bottom of the command window. For example:

```
[Storing D:/Users/Administrator/<PS_CFG_HOME>/pt/<DOMAIN>/webserv/peoplesoft\piaconfig/keystore/pskey]
```



Disabling Configuration Reinitialization

Configuration reinitialization can cause a denial of service.

The configuration that enables dynamic re-initialization is set by default only on the *PROD* web profile; no other profile has this setting enabled. However, an administrator may possibly have set this on a production system.

To disable configuration reinitialization delete the row for property names set to *auditPWD* in the web profile. The following example shows the *auditPWD* property name defined for the *dayoff* property value:

To disable configuration reinitialization:

1. In PIA, navigate to PeopleTools, Web Profile, Web Profile Configuration.
2. Select the web profile that you want to configure, for example, PROD.
3. Select the Custom Properties tab.
4. Delete any entries in the Property Name field with the value auditPWD.
5. Save your changes.

Prohibiting Unregistered Content

Unregistered content is web content which is referenced from a PeopleSoft system, but is not listed in the portal registry or that originates from a registered portal node.

By registering the content that interacts with your PeopleSoft application, you can prevent your resources from being redirected to unknown and potentially malicious sites.

The portal will not include a content link in a URL if it is not registered in the portal registry or if it isn't coming from a registered node, unless the Web Profile configuration setting Allow Unregistered Content is selected.

To prohibit unregistered content:

1. In PIA, navigate to PeopleTools, Web Profile, Web Profile Configuration.
2. Select the web profile that you want to configure, for example, PROD.
3. Select the Security page.
4. Make sure that the Allow Unregistered Content is deselected.
5. Save your changes.

Authorizing Resource Access Using Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)

The CORS standard gives web servers cross-domain access controls, which enable secure cross-domain data transfers.

1. Use the Authorized Site page to maintain sites that are authorized to request resources from this web server using the Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) standard. In PIA, navigate to PeopleTools, Web Profile, Web Profile Configuration.
2. Select the web profile that you want to configure, for example, PROD.
3. Select the Authorized Site tab.
4. Select the CORS checkbox to indicate that this authorization is for Cross-Origin Resource Sharing
5. In the Host field, enter the cross-domain host that is to be allowed to request resources from your web server.
6. In the Protocol field, select https as protocol in order to only allow requests from that specific host if the connection is secured with SSL. When no value is specified, requests from both secure and unsecured URLs can be accepted.

7. In the Port Number field, enter a port number in order to only allow requests from that specific host if it uses that specific port number. When no value is specified, requests from that host will be accepted regardless of the port number.
8. Select the Domain Compare box in order to authorize other hosts within the same authentication token domain to request resources from this PeopleSoft web server. Note: When this option is not selected, you must create individual host entries to authorize other hosts within the same authentication token domain.
9. Save your changes.

Disabling Browser Caching for Applications Deployed in Kiosk Environments

A browser will cache various pages and states in memory to increase performance. You may need to disable these performance features on the browser for security reasons. Note that once caching is disabled, the Back button on the browser stops working in PIA.

Note: If you deploy Microsoft Windows workstations as kiosks in common areas for facilitating access to sensitive personal information, such as pay slips, and you don't require individual network login for access to these workstations, you should strongly consider deploying robust kiosk software.

To disable caching:

1. In PIA, navigate to PeopleTools, Web Profile, Web Profile Configuration.
2. Select the web profile that you want to configure, for example, PROD.
3. Select the Caching tab.
4. Make sure that the Cache Generated HTML and Cache Homepage check boxes are both cleared.
5. Save your changes.

Configuring Forward Proxy Servers for the Portal and Integration Gateway

To configure a forward proxy server for the portal and the integration gateway, set the following system properties:

```
http.proxyHost=proxy.corp.com
http.proxyPort=5080
https.proxyHost=proxy.corp.com
https.proxyPort=5443
```

Where *proxy.corp.com* is the machine running the proxy server, and 5080 and 5443 are examples of the HTTP and HTTPS listening ports for the proxy, respectively. These system values are set differently for WebLogic and WebSphere and are shown in the following sections.

Setting a Forward Proxy Server for WebLogic

For WebLogic, edit the setEnv.cmd (setEnv.sh on UNIX) and set the following environment variables:

```
# HTTP_PROXY_ENABLE      - Enable the use of the following forward http proxy
# HTTP_PROXY_HTTPHOST    - IP/hostname of forward http proxy server to for
#                          HTTP requests.
#
#
# HTTP_PROXY_HTTPSPORT    - HTTP Port number of forward http proxy server.
# HTTP_PROXY_HTTPSHOST    - IP/hostname of forward http proxy server for
#                          HTTPS requests
#
#
# HTTP_PROXY_HTTPSPORT    - HTTPS Port number of forward http proxy server.
```

Setting a Forward Proxy Server for WebSphere

Set the properties using the WebSphere Administration console:

1. Log on to WebSphere Administration console.
2. Expand Servers, Application Servers, server1, Process Definition, Java Virtual Machine, Custom Properties.
3. Click New Key/Value pair and add the following new pairs:

```
Key="http.proxyHost", Value="forward proxy hostname"
Key="http.proxyPort", Value="forward proxy HTTP port"
Key="https.proxyHost", Value="forward proxy hostname"
Key="https.proxyPort", Value="forward proxy HTTPS port"
```

4. Save the configuration changes, log off, and restart WebSphere.

Bypassing Forward Proxies for Local Hosts

To bypass a forward proxy server for the portal and integration gateway, set up the following system property:

```
http.nonProxyHosts=machinename1.corp.com|machinename2.corp.com|...
```

Use a different machine name for each host that you want to bypass. The value is a list of host names separated by the pipe (|) symbol. For example, to bypass the proxy for hosts *a.corp.com* and *b.corp.com*, the value should be:

```
http.nonProxyHosts=a.corp.com|b.corp.com
```

You can also bypass all servers in a domain by using an asterisk (*) as a wildcard, indicating that all servers in .corp.com domain are bypassed from using the proxy.:

```
http.nonProxyHosts=*.corp.com
```

You set this property (one value) for both HTTP and HTTPS. The system value is set differently for WebLogic and WebSphere, as discussed in the following sections.

Bypassing Forward Proxy for Local Hosts (WebLogic)

For WebLogic, edit setEnv.cmd (setEnv.sh on UNIX) and set the corresponding environment variables:

```
# HTTP_PROXY_NONPROXY_HTTPHOSTS - Host names and domain names of HTTP
#                               content to not proxy.
```

Bypassing Forward Proxy for Local Hosts (WebSphere)

Set the property using the WebSphere Administration console.

1. Log on to the WebSphere Administration console.
2. Expand Servers, Application Servers, server1, Process Definition, Java Virtual Machine, Custom Properties.
3. Click New Key,Value pair and add the following new pairs:

```
Key="http.nonProxyHosts"
Value="machinename1.corp.com|machinename2.corp.com|..."
```

4. Save the configuration changes, log off and restart WebSphere.

Enabling Mutual Authentication for Integrations

Common practice is to use SSL certificate-based mutual authentication for the integration gateway. To set up your integration gateway for mutual authentication, please follow the instructions in *PeopleTools 8.55: Integration Broker Administration* "Setting Up Secure Integration Environments," Installing Gateway-Based Digital Certificates.

Using FTPs and SSH Protocols

When available use one of the following protocols instead of File Transfer Protocol (FTP):

- » File Transfer Protocol over SSL (FTPs), or
- » SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) instead of FTP.

Encrypting the Integration Gateway Properties File Password

When possible, encrypt the password for the integrationGateway.properties file.

Enabling LDAPs for Directory Integration

LDAP directory access should be configured to be secure by using LDAP over SSL (LDAPs). The process is described PeopleBooks.

For more information see the product documentation for *PeopleTools 8.55: Security Administration*, "Employing LDAP Directory Services," Using LDAP Over SSL (LDAPs).

Disabling Anonymous Bind on LDAP

When employing LDAP directory services, disable anonymous bind.

Enabling TUXEDO Encryption

Currently, Link Level Encryption (LLE) is the default encryption for Java server listener (JSL) connections to the WebLogic Java container to the Tuxedo application server. LLE is being deprecated. While LLE is still supported, you should upgrade to SSL.

The following example illustrates the LLE warning in Tuxedo:

```
=====
Tuxedo 12.1.3 RP005 adds a warning message:
WARNING: LLE Configuration discovered! Note that LLE has been
deprecated. You should upgrade to SSL to secure network links.
RP005 (or greater) also provides a Tuxedo environment variable or a
JOLT property for suppressing the message:

Internal Tuxedo environment variable:

LLE_DEPRECATION_WARN_LEVEL
NONE: No warning
ONCE: warning once for one process
Other value (default): warning every time when a LLE connection initializes.

Internal Jolt environment variable:

tuxedo.jolt.LLEDeprecationWarnLevel
NONE: No warning
ONCE: warning once for one process
Other value (default): warning every time when a LLE connection initializes.
=====
```



To implement SSL, see “Configuring SSL for JSL/WSL connections for Tuxedo in PeopleSoft” attached to Doc ID 1242154.1 on the Oracle support web site.

To enable TUDEDO-level encryption, LLE, edit the configuration file psappsrv.cfg for the domain. Change the Encryption property for the Workstation Listener and the JOLT Listener sections. The default value of 0 does not encrypt. Change the value to 64 for 64-bit encryption or to 128 for 128-bit encryption:

[Workstation Listener]

```
=====
; Settings for Workstation Listener
=====
;Address Note: Can be either Machine Name or IP address.
;Address Note: %PS_MACH% will be replaced with THIS machine's name
Address=%PS_MACH%
Port=7000
Encryption=128
Min Handlers=1
Max Handlers=2
Max Clients per Handler=40
Client Cleanup Timeout=60
Init Timeout=5
Tuxedo Compression Threshold=5000
```

[JOLT Listener]

```
=====
; Settings for JOLT Listener
=====
;Address Note: Can be either Machine Name or IP address.
;Address Note: %PS_MACH% will be replaced with THIS machine's name
;Address Note: 0.0.0.0 enables JSL to bind to all IP addresses mapped for this
machine
Address=0.0.0.0
Port=9000
Encryption=128
Min Handlers=1
Max Handlers=2
Max Clients per Handler=40
Client Cleanup Timeout=60
Init Timeout=5
Client Connection Mode=ANY
Jolt Compression Threshold=1000000
```



Using ASO Encryption (Oracle Database)

If using an Oracle database, use ASO encryption to connect to the database



Chapter 5: PeopleTools Security Hardening

PeopleSoft applications are depended on to deliver data in a secure, reliable fashion. Data integrity, confidentiality, and availability must be maintained. PeopleTools must be installed and maintained in a manner that prevents unauthorized access, unauthorized use, and disruptions in service.

This chapter describes the requirements for installing and operating PeopleTools to maintain the security integrity of PeopleTools and the application software. This chapter applies to all individuals who are responsible for installation of new software, operation of existing software, and security administration.

Before a PeopleSoft application is put into production, you should take reasonable steps to ensure that PeopleTools security has been hardened. Through the appropriate use of PeopleTools authentication, authorization, and audit functionality, you can help mitigate risk to your security infrastructure.

The hardening procedure is a group of tasks that should be completed to harden PeopleTools. Many of these items are industry-standard best practices; others are specific to PeopleTools. This list is by no means exhaustive; however, it should give you a feel for items to check. This section discusses several of the general steps to include in the PeopleTools hardening procedure.

This section discusses considerations, guidelines and procedures for how to:

- » Delete or disable unused user IDs.
- » Enable password controls.
- » Force users to change passwords.
- » Prohibit passwords to be emailed.
- » Review sign in and time-out security.
- » Change the access password.
- » Change the connect password.
- » Change the integration broker gateway properties file password.
- » Review the single signon configuration.
- » Use node passwords or node certificates.
- » Review signon PeopleCode and user exits.
- » Limit use of the PeopleSoft Administrator role.
- » Limit access to Application Designer and Data Mover.
- » Limit access to user profiles, roles, and permission lists.
- » Limit the ability to start the application server.
- » Review PeopleSoft Query security.
- » Enable SQL error message suppression.
- » Track user login and logout activity.
- » Secure installation and configuration directories.
- » Employ auditing.

Deleting or Disabling Unused User IDs

Every delivered PeopleSoft database comes with several default User IDs. Before migrating a database into production, it is critical that you identify these IDs and either delete or disable them.

Deleting User Profiles

To delete a user profile:

1. Select PeopleTools, Security, User Profiles, Delete User Profiles to access the Delete User Profile page.
2. Make sure that you have selected the correct user profile.
3. Click Delete User Profile to remove information related to this particular user profile that appears in PeopleTools, application tables, and every security table in the system.

Disabling User Profiles

To disable a user profile:

1. Select PeopleTools, Security, User Profiles, User Profiles to access the Find Existing Values page.
2. Select the user ID that you want to disable.
3. Select the Account Locked Out check box to disable the user profile. The user can't sign on until you clear this check box again.

Enabling Password Controls

If you're using PeopleSoft user ID and password authentication, you are strongly encouraged to enable password controls and follow industry best practices with regard to the settings. You use the Password Controls page to set password restrictions such as duration and minimum length of a password that you might want to impose on your end users.

To access the Password Controls page, select PeopleTools, Security, Password Configuration, Password Controls.

The following table describes the controls on the Password Controls page:

Enable Signon PeopleCode	<p>Select this check box to enable the Age and Account Lockout password controls. The other password controls are not enabled by this field.</p> <p>If you don't want these password controls when, for example, you already have a third-party utility that performs equivalent features, leave this check box cleared.</p> <p>Note. You can extend or customize the controls by modifying the PeopleCode.</p>
Age	<p>You define a number of days (from 1 and 365) that a password is valid. To do this, select the Password Expires in <i>N</i> Days option. Users signing on after a password expires must change their passwords before they can sign on. If you don't want the password to expire, select <i>Password Never Expires</i>. When a password expires, the user can't sign on to the system and will be prompted to change it.</p> <p>If you want to specify a period during which the system warns users that their password is about to expire, you have the following options:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">» If you want to specify a warning period, select <i>Warn for N Days</i>, and enter the number of days in the edit box.» If you don't want any warning period, select <i>Do not warn of expiration</i>. <p>PeopleSoft delivers a default permission list named PSWDEXPR (Password Expired).</p>



When a password expires for a user, the system automatically revokes all of that user's roles and permission lists and temporarily assigns them the PSWDEXPR permission list only.

A user whose password has expired can access only items in the PSWDEXPR permission list, which typically grants access to the Change Password component only. For the duration of the session, until the user changes the password, the user is restricted solely to the PSWDEXPR permission list.

Note. The actual user profile stored in the database is not changed in any way when the password expires. You don't need to redefine the profile. When the password is changed, the system restores the user profile's previous roles and permission lists.

Account Lockout This control enables you to lock an account after a specified number of failed logon attempts. For example, if you set the Maximum Logon Attempts value to 3, and a user fails three consecutive logons, he or she is automatically locked out of the system. Even if the user correctly enters a user ID and password on the fourth attempt, the user is not permitted to log on. This feature reduces the risk of any "brute force" intruders into your system. It also provides a reminder to your end users to remember the password they choose.

After the account is locked out, a system administrator needs to open the user profile and clear the Account Locked check box manually.

Miscellaneous The Allow password to match User ID control enables administrators to ensure that users don't use their own user ID as a password. This helps you prevent hackers from guessing passwords based on a list of employee names.

Minimum Length Administrators can opt to set a minimum length for passwords maintained by the PeopleSoft system. If the minimum length is set to 0, the PeopleSoft password controls do not enforce a minimum length on the user's password. This does not, however, imply that the password can be blank. When you create a new user or a user changes a password, the system checks this value. If it is not zero, the system tests the password to ensure that it meets length requirements, and if it doesn't, an error message appears.

Character Requirements Administrators can require a set number of digits or special characters within a password. Special characters, or *specials*, are symbols such as # and @, and digits are numbers (integers), such as 1 or 2.

Here is the list of special characters that you can include within a password:

! @ # \$ % ^ & * () - _ = + \ | [] { } ; : / ? . > <



Purge User Profiles This setting enables you to purge the system of user profiles that have not been used in a specified amount of time. This aids in general housekeeping. In particular, if you maintain user profiles in a directory server, a row is still added to the PSOPRDEFN table for the system to access while the user interacts with the system. However, if that user is deleted from the directory server, you still need to delete the row in PSOPRDEFN that is associated with the deleted user profile.

Note. The Application Engine program that performs this operation is named PURGEOLDUSERS.

Forcing Users to Change Passwords

If you're using PeopleSoft password controls, we recommend that you use force users to change their passwords in the following situations:

- » The first time that a user signs in to PeopleSoft.
- » The next time that a user signs in.
- » The first time that a user signs in after the system has emailed the user a randomly generated password.

To force users to change their passwords at their next login:

1. Select PeopleTools, Security, User Profiles, User Profiles to access the Find Existing Values page.
2. Select the user ID that you want.
3. On the General page, select the Expire Password At Next Login check box.

Note. To use this option, you must first enable the Password Expires in *N* Days PeopleSoft password control

Prohibiting Passwords to be Emailed

PeopleTools contains functionality that will enable users to receive a new password via email if they have forgotten their existing one. At some sites, the security administrator may not want passwords appearing unencrypted in anyone's email. You implement this feature using a permission list. No one can use it, some can use it, or all can use it, depending on your implementation. Users who don't have the proper authority receive an error message if they attempt to have a new password emailed to them.

To change this setting:

1. Select PeopleTools, Security, Permissions & Roles, Permission Lists.
2. On the search page, search for the permission list that you want to modify and select it.
3. The Permission List component appears.
4. On the General page, review the setting of the Allow Password to be Emailed check box.

Note. If the user is a member of at least one permission list for which this check box is selected, then they will be allowed to have a new password emailed.

Reviewing Sign In and Time-Out Security

A user attempting to sign in to PeopleSoft enters a user ID and a password on the PeopleSoft Signon page. If the ID and password are valid, PeopleSoft connects the user to the application, and the system retrieves the appropriate user profile.

If the user attempts to sign in during an invalid sign-in time, as defined in the user's security profile, the user is not allowed to sign in. A sign-in time is an adjustable interval during which a user is allowed to sign in to PeopleSoft. For



example, if a given sign-in time is Monday through Friday from 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. for a set of users, those users cannot access a PeopleSoft application at any time on Saturday or on Friday at 6:05 p.m.

After a user signs in, he or she can stay connected as long as the sign-in time allows and as long as the browser doesn't sit idle for longer than the time-out interval. A time-out interval specifies how long the user's machine can remain idle before PeopleSoft automatically disconnects the user from the application.

You specify both the sign-in times and the time-out interval using PeopleTools Security. The sign-in times are maintained on the Signon Times page of the permission list. The time-out settings are maintained on the General page of the permission list. These settings should be reviewed prior to moving a PeopleSoft application into production.

Changing the Access Password

The PeopleSoft access ID is the RDBMS ID with which PeopleSoft applications are ultimately connected to your database after the PeopleSoft system authenticates the user. The access ID has all the RDBMS privileges necessary to access and manipulate data for an entire PeopleSoft application.

Due to the privileges associated with the access ID, it is extremely important that you choose a strong access password (for example, minimum length of 8 characters, including any combination of mixed case, numerals, and special characters, and so on.). Generally, we recommend that only your database administrator should know this password. In addition, we recommend that this password be changed periodically (for example, every 30 days).

To change an Access Profile password:

1. In Application Designer, select Tools, Miscellaneous Definitions, Access Profiles.
2. The Access Profiles dialog box appears.
3. In the Access Profiles list, highlight the profile that you want to modify and click Edit.
4. The Change Access Profile dialog box appears. This dialog box provides fields to enter the old password and the new password, and to confirm the new password for the Access Profile.
5. Enter and confirm the new password.
6. The Access Password is the password string for the ID. Confirm Password is a required field and its value must match that of Access Password.
7. Click OK.

Changing the Connect Password

The connect ID is an RDBMS ID that's used to perform the initial connection to the database when an application server is booted, or during a two-tier connection. Although this ID only has select privileges on a handful of tables, we still recommend that you select a strong connect password, keep it confidential, and change it periodically.

To change the connect password, you'll need to follow your RDBMS-specific instructions. After you've changed the password, remember that you'll also need to change it in your application server configuration and in Configuration. When specifying the connect password for an application server in the PSADMIN utility, be sure to select the option to encrypt it.

If you have two-tier users, we recommend that you set the connect password once in Configuration Manager and then roll the configuration out to your user community.

Note: You should frequently review the use of two-tier user accounts since they these types of accounts are generally only required for LCM and Data Mover utilities.

Changing the Integration Broker Gateway Properties File Password

The default username and password combination for accessing the Integration Broker gateway properties is *administrator/password*. This password should be changed prior to production.

On the authentication page that protects gateway properties administration, a check box is available labeled Change password. Selecting this check box when signing in enables an administrator to change the default password to a password that follows stricter (for instance corporate policy) password guidelines.

Reviewing the Single Signon Configuration

PeopleSoft supports single signon within PeopleSoft applications. Within the context of your PeopleSoft system, single signon means that after a user has been authenticated by one PeopleSoft application server, that user can access a second PeopleSoft application server without entering an ID or a password. Although the user is actually accessing different applications and databases, the user navigates seamlessly through the system. Recall that each suite of PeopleSoft applications, such as HR or CRM, resides in its own database.

After the first application server and node authenticates a user, PeopleSoft delivers a web browser cookie containing an authentication token. PeopleSoft Internet Architecture uses web browser cookies to store a unique access token for each user after he or she are authenticated initially. When the user connects to another PeopleSoft application server and node, the second application server uses the token in the browser cookie to re-authenticate the user behind the scenes so that they don't have to complete the sign-on process again.

Single signon is critical for PeopleSoft portal implementations because the portal integrates content from various data sources and application servers and presents them in a unified interface. When users sign in through the portal, they always take advantage of single signon. Users need to sign on once and be able to navigate freely without encountering numerous signon screens.

Before a PeopleSoft application is migrated into production, reviewing the single signon configuration is very important. For each database, you should review which nodes you're going to accept authentication tokens from. You do not want a production system accepting authentication tokens from an untrusted system (or a system it should not trust).

To review your single signon configuration, select PeopleTools, Security, Security Objects, Single Signon to access the Single Signon page

The following table briefly describes the controls on the page:

Expiration time in minutes	You need to set an expiration time for the tokens that this system accepts for authentication.
Message Node name	Shows the name of a trusted message node. To share authentication tokens between nodes, the nodes need to trust each other. By adding a node to this grid, you indicate that a particular node is known to the system and trusted. When a node is trusted, the local node accepts tokens issued by it.
Local Node	Indicates whether the node is local.

For additional information see the product documentation for *PeopleTools 8.55: Security Administration*, "Implementing Single Signon."

Using Node Passwords or Node Certificates

When you configure nodes for single signon, two authentication options are available: password authentication and certificate authentication. The more secure of the two is certificate authentication. If you choose to use password authentication, be sure to select a strong password and change it periodically.

You set up node definitions using the Portal, Node Definitions component. The two options related to single signon are as follows:

- Authentication Option** Determines how nodes in a single signon configuration authenticate other nodes in the same configuration. You have the following options:
- » *None*. Specifies no authentication between nodes.
 - Note.** This option conflicts with PeopleSoft Integration Broker. If you select None, PeopleSoft Integration Broker messaging will fail, as will Single Signon.
 - » *Password*. Indicates that each node in the single signon configuration authenticates other nodes by way of knowing the password for each node.

For example, if three nodes exist (A, B, and C), the password for Node A needs to be specified on its local node definition on Node A, as well as the remote node definitions on Node B and Node C.
 - » *Certificate*. Indicates that a digital certificate authenticates each node in the single signon configuration. PeopleSoft recommends using certificate authentication for single signon. For certificate authentication, you need to have the following in the key store in the database for each node:
 - » A digital certificate for each node.
 - » The root certificate for the CA that issued the node certificate.
- Important!** For single signon, the alias for the certificate of a node needs to be the *same* as the node name. You *must* set up your digital certificates before you select *Certificate* as the authentication option.
- Default Local Node** The default local node is used specifically for setting up single signon. This indicates that the current node represents the database you're signed in to. The options that you set for single signon should be made in the default local node definition.

Reviewing Signon PeopleCode and User Exits

Signon PeopleCode is delivered that allows you to enable directory-based authentication, password controls, and other functionality. In addition, signon PeopleCode and user exits can be used to customize the authentication process.

Before putting a system into production, all signon PeopleCode and user exits should be carefully reviewed and tested. Mistakes in this area could lead to serious authentication vulnerabilities.

For more information see the product documentation for PeopleTools 8.55: Security Administration, "Employing Signon PeopleCode and User Exits."



Limiting Use of the PeopleSoft Administrator Role

Generally, only a handful of users—perhaps even just one user—should have the PeopleSoft Administrator role. A user with this special role is authorized for virtually everything within the PeopleSoft system. Keeping at least one user ID with this role is essential so that you will not be in a situation in which you're locked out of the security administration pages. You should choose a strong password for this user and change the password periodically.

The Roles component includes queries that you can run to determine which users are associated with each role.

Limiting Access to Application Designer and Data Mover

In a development system, numerous users will likely have access to PeopleSoft Application Designer and PeopleSoft Data Mover; however, in a production system, access to these development tools should be strictly limited.

Generally, these development tools should not be used in production. Rather, development should be done in a separate database, tested, and then migrated into production using the upgrade tools.

Note that if any users can access development tools in a production system, they can change virtually any data in the database. For example, with PeopleSoft Data Mover access or a SQLExec in PeopleCode, any SQL could be run against the database.

To lock down access to the design tools, review the settings on the PeopleTools page of the Permission List definition.

Limiting Access to User Profiles, Roles and Permission Lists

In your production system, only your security administrator should have access to the user profiles, roles, and permission lists. If any other users have access to these components, they could possibly elevate their own privilege levels.

Several queries are delivered for user profiles, roles, and permission lists that will provide a good picture of who has access to what. This information should be carefully reviewed prior to going live as well as periodically to ensure that security policies and guidelines are being maintained.

Limiting the Ability to Start the Application Server

On the General page of the Permission List component is a control with the label "Can Start Application Server?". This option should be selected only for the user ID that's being used to start the application server; otherwise, a rogue application server could possibly be started.



The following table provides a definition of the control:

Can Start Application Server? Select to enable a user profile with this permission to start a PeopleSoft application server. This can be a user ID used solely for starting the application server. At least one of the permission lists associated with the user ID used for starting the application server must have this permission selected.

This user ID is not the user ID of the actual user who signs in to an application server and starts it by submitting the appropriate commands. Rather, this option applies to the user ID and password that you enter into PSADMIN (or PSAPPSRV.CFG) in the Startup section. This is the user ID that the application server uses to connect to the database. In many installations, the application server starts with an automated process, not by a user physically submitting the commands.

When you build an application server domain, one of the parameters that an administrator enters is a PeopleSoft user ID (and password). These values are contained in a configuration file that BEA Tuxedo reads when the application server is started. The user ID stored in the file is the user ID that requires the Can Start Application Server option set in a permission list with which it's associated.

Note. This permission also applies to starting a PeopleSoft Process Scheduler server. Password controls don't apply for the user profile that's used to start the application server.

Reviewing PeopleSoft Query Security

PeopleSoft Query is an end user-reporting tool that helps you build SQL queries to retrieve information from your application tables.

Query takes advantage of a user's security settings, row-level security, and primary permission list. You can specify the records that each Query Manager or Query Viewer user is allowed to access when building and running queries.

Note that Query permissions are enforced only when you are using Query; it doesn't control runtime page access to table data.

Permission Lists

Use Query Access Manager (PeopleTools, Security, Query Security, Query Access Manager) to define query access group trees. Each tree contains access groups (nodes) and records (PeopleSoft record definitions) categorized by function (similar to folders in Microsoft Windows).

After you build a query access group tree, you give users access to one or more of its access groups using the Permission List Access Groups page (PeopleTools, Security, Permissions and Roles, Permission Lists and click the Query tab, Access Permissions link).

Row-Level Security

With row-level security, users can access a table (record) without having access to all rows on that table. PeopleSoft applications implement row-level security by using a SQL view that joins the data table with an authorization table. When a user searches for data in the data table, the system performs a related record join between the view and the base table rather than searching the table directly. The view adds a security check to the search, based on the criteria you've set up for row-level security.



Row-level security is implemented in the Application Designer. Open the desired record definition, click the Properties button, and select the Use tab from the Record Properties dialog box. Then select the security record definition (usually a view) in the Query Security Record list box.

Query is a very powerful tool and thus query security should be reviewed very carefully prior to production.

For more information see the product documentation for *PeopleTools 8.55: Security Administration*, "Implementing Query Security."

Enabling SQL Error Message Suppression

You can enable SQL error suppression by updating the PeopleSoft application server configuration file. This file, called `psappsrv.cfg`, can be found in the application server directory under the database-named folder. Add the following line to the file:

```
Suppress SQL Error = 1
```

Generally, you'll want detailed SQL errors during development; however, in a production environment, best practice is to suppress the SQL error messages. If attackers can manipulate SQL queries through parameters, input fields, or in specialized locations such as Query Manager, they can generate invalid SQL that causes the database to return an error message to the application server. When the application displays this error message, the attackers gain information about the underlying query structure, database type, table names, column names, and other useful information that could be used to launch more sophisticated attacks. Database attack is much more difficult when attackers must guess blindly at query structure and cannot view error messages to understand why specially constructed queries fail.

Tracking User Login and Logout Activity

PeopleSoft Security provides two audit logs that track users' sign-in and sign-out activity in PeopleSoft. Sign-out activity includes time-outs, browser closings, and browser freezes.

Access these logs by navigating to PeopleTools, Security, Common Queries. Select Access Log Queries, then one of the following logs:

- Access Activity by User** View a single user's login and logout activity. This log includes a user's Client IP address, login times and logout times.
- » **Access Activity by Day** View one or more days of all user logins and logouts. This log includes user IDs, client IP addresses, and login times and logout times.

Securing Installation and Configuration Directories

This section discusses PeopleSoft software installation and configuration directories, and procedures and considerations for securing them.



Understanding PS_HOME and PS_CFG_HOME Directories

On any server on which you install the PeopleSoft software, the installation program installs the required files into one high-level directory structure, referred to as PS_HOME. After the program creates a domain, the configuration files associated with that domain reside in a directory structure referred to as PS_CFG_HOME. The contents of these directories can be summarized as follows:

PS_HOME	Compiled, non-modifiable executable files and libraries.
PS_CFG_HOME	Text files associated with the configuration and administration of a domain. Some files in this directory can be system-generated. The files in this directory can be viewed and modified.

The decoupling of the file types in these separate directory structures enables system administrators to:

- » Streamline and provide more flexible PeopleSoft server installations.
- » Apply unique security restrictions to the binary file and configuration file locations.

By default, the system separates the binary files (executables and libraries) stored in PS_HOME from the ASCII files (configuration and log files) associated with a domain stored in PS_CFG_HOME. This separation of the binary and ASCII files applies to these servers:

- » PeopleSoft Application Server.
- » PeopleSoft Process Scheduler Server.
- » PeopleSoft Search Server.

Securing PS_HOME and PS_CFG_HOME Directories

With the separation of the PS_HOME and PS_CFG_HOME directories, system administrators can implement more secure PeopleSoft deployments by restricting access within each of these directory structures.

PeopleBooks documentation provides information securing PS_HOME and PS_CFG_HOME directories:

For more information see the product documentation for *PeopleTools 8.55: System and Server Administration*, “Securing PS_HOME and PS_CFG_HOME.”

Employing Auditing

Part of any successful security strategy is auditing. PeopleTools provides two methods of auditing, records-based and database-level auditing, which you should review and consider using in your production system. For more information about the two alternatives, please see the following documentation:

For more information see the product documentation for PeopleTools 8.55: Data Management, “Employing Database Level Auditing.”

Oracle Audit Vault

Satisfying compliance regulations such as SOX, PCI, and HIPAA and mitigating security risks are among the top security challenges businesses face today. Today the use of audit data as a security resource remains very much a manual process, requiring IT security and audit personnel to sift through large amounts of dispersed audit data and create reports to meet internal and external auditor requirements.



Oracle Audit Vault automates the audit collection, monitoring and reporting process, turning audit data into a key security resource for detecting unauthorized activity.

Oracle Audit Vault supports multiple database platforms.

The Oracle Audit Vault Reports interface provides entitlement reports with up-to-date snapshots of Oracle Database users, privileges, and profiles, which enable auditors to track changes to database access and out-of-the-box reports to help meet compliance regulations as well as charting capabilities.

Chapter 6: Securing Customized PeopleSoft Applications

PeopleSoft devotes a lot of attention and resources to delivering a secure product to its customers. However, most customers don't implement PeopleSoft applications as they are delivered. To enable customers to meet their unique business needs, PeopleSoft software can be configured in many ways. If your organization modifies the delivered applications, this new code must be secured.

If you modify the delivered PeopleSoft application, use the following guidelines to verify that these changes don't compromise the security of your implementation:

- » Every component should have appropriate row-level security.
- » Defend against SQL injection. All user-entered data that is part of dynamic SQL must be isolated to a bind variable.
- » All user-entered HTML must be escaped.
- » No user-entered files names should contain complete or relative paths.

Configuring Every Component for Row-Level Security

Every component should apply row-level security that's appropriate for the end user.

Note. In some cases no row-level security is appropriate.

Row-level security can be implemented in several ways, such as:

- » Applying security using search views.
- » Applying security using search prompt views.
- » Applying security using an application-specific framework. (For example, HR manager self-service or application-coded search pages.)

Determine the method used by your product or product line and ensure that your component adheres to the standards used for that product.

Isolating All User-Entered Data into Bind Variables

Take care anytime you construct a SQL statement using user input as part of that statement. Never allow the end-user to enter a string that contains an entire SQL statement or a SQL fragment. To ensure security, use the user data as a bind variable rather than concatenating it to a SQL statement.

For example, suppose that the user supplies a value for a WHERE condition:

Correct: `SELECT ABC FROM TABLE A WHERE A = :1`

Incorrect: `SELECT ABC FROM TABLE A WHERE A = | user-entered-value`

Escaping All User-Entered HTML

If you're writing your own HTML and plan to use user-supplied values, then user values should contain displayable data and not scripts.

All string data must be escaped by calling the EscapeHTML PeopleCode function. For example:

```
&myHTML = &myHTML | EscapeHTML(&user-supplied string)
```



Omitting Paths from User-Entered File Names

If you have applications that enable users to specify a destination path to store files, you should allow only file names and directories as separate items, instead of a path.

Correct: Location: Appserver File: myfile.xxx
(assuming that this is appended to a specified home location).

Incorrect: C:\appserver\myfile.xxx

Working with Web Service Security (WS-Security)

WS-Security provides a way to insert and convey security tokens in SOAP messages. The ability to leverage WS-Security standards provides for better interoperability and improved usability, enabling the implementation of robust security within a WSRP-capable environment.

The OASIS WS-Security specification is the open standard for web services security. Its goal is to let applications secure SOAP message exchanges by providing encryption, integrity, and authentication support. It provides authentication support for SOAP messaging. WS-Security offers these general-purpose mechanisms for associating security tokens with message content:

- » Username token.
- » SAML token.

It is not practical to describe in detail here the full capabilities and implementation requirements for WS-Security. For more information see the following sources for additional information:

- » Product documentation for *PeopleTools 8.55: Security Administration*, “Working with Web Service Security (WS-Security).”
- » The Application Server Web Services Security Guide located at http://download.oracle.com/docs/cd/B25221_04/web.1013/b15979/usecases.htm#CIHHHJIA

Protecting PDF PeopleSoft BI Publisher Reports

You can password-protect a PeopleSoft BI Publisher PDF report by requiring users to enter a password to open a report.

You define the password in the pdf-open-password property on the PDF Security property group on the Report Definition – Properties page, or define it programmatically at runtime using the PeopleCode API

Defining PDF Report Passwords in Report Definitions

The following example shows the Report Definition – Properties page and the properties of the PDF Security property group:

The screenshot shows a web interface for defining report properties. At the top, there are tabs for 'Definition', 'Template', 'Output', 'Properties', and 'Security'. The 'Properties' tab is selected. Below the tabs, the 'Report Name' is 'QE_EMP_LIST'. Under 'Report Properties', the 'Property Group' is set to 'PDF Security'. Below this is a table titled 'Property Settings' with columns for 'Property', 'Prompt', 'Password', and 'Default'. The 'pdf-open-password' row is highlighted with a red box, showing an empty text input field in the 'Password' column. Other rows include 'pdf-security', 'pdf-permissions-password', 'pdf-encryption-level', 'pdf-no-printing', 'pdf-no-changing-the-document', 'pdf-no-cceda', 'pdf-no-accff', 'pdf-enable-accessibility', 'pdf-enable-copying', 'pdf-changes-allowed', and 'pdf-printing-allowed'.

Property	Prompt	Password	Default
pdf-security			True
pdf-open-password		<input type="text"/>	
pdf-permissions-password		<input type="text"/>	
pdf-encryption-level			2
pdf-no-printing			False
pdf-no-changing-the-document			True
pdf-no-cceda			False
pdf-no-accff			False
pdf-enable-accessibility			True
pdf-enable-copying			False
pdf-changes-allowed			0
pdf-printing-allowed			2

Defining PDF Report Passwords Programmatically

To define a PDF report password programmatically, use `SetRuntimeProperties` method of `ReportDefn` class.

You would create 2 arrays, one of property names, one with property values respectively, and then pass them to the method to set them at runtime:

The following example illustrates setting the property using `PeopleCode`:

```
...
&asPropName = CreateArrayRept("", 0);
&asPropValue = CreateArrayRept("", 0);
&asPropName.Push("pdf-open-password");
&asPropValue.Push("test");
&oRptDefn.SetRuntimeProperties(&asPropName, &asPropValue);

&oRptDefn.ProcessReport(&sTemplateId, %Language_User, &dAsOfDate,
&sOutputFormat);
```

Note that the `SetRuntimeProperties` method needs to be called right before the `ProcessReport` method is called:



You can override all security-related report properties at runtime through PeopleCode using the `SetRuntimeProperties` method.

Do not hard-code the password value in the code; instead, if the password is stored encrypted in the database or somewhere else, you can use the `Decrypt` method.

For more information, see the product documentation for:

- » PeopleTools 8.55: BI Publisher for PeopleSoft.
- » PeopleTools 8.55: PeopleCode API Reference

You can read more about the configurable options in the Oracle Business Intelligence Publisher User's Guide at the following location:

http://download.oracle.com/docs/cd/E10383_01/doc/bip.1013/b40017/T421739T421745.htm#4419522

Appendix A: Exposing PeopleSoft Outside the Network

This appendix presents a number of approaches to self-service architecture, based on discussions with customers and consultants.

Extra layers of security are provided by intrusion detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS) and web application firewalls (WAF).

None of these suggested deployments can be regarded as best, because every customer environment is a compromise between the cost of the deployment and the evaluated risks.

In the diagrams featured in this appendix, the terms *PIA server* and *Tuxedo server* are used as logical rather than physical designations to differentiate the web server/Java application server and the business logic application server.


Real-Time Synchronization - Manager and Employee Self Service

With Manager and Employee Self Service, a greater need exists for real-time and near real-time synchronization. This section provides examples or:

- » Single-stack real-time synchronization.
- » Dual-stack real-time synchronization.


Single-Stack Real-Time Synchronization

The following example illustrates single-stack real-time synchronization:



Dual-Stack Real-Time Synchronization

The following example illustrates dual-stack real-time synchronization, with separate support for external access but using a common database:



Periodic Synchronization - Manager and Employee Self-Service


Self-service applications such as PeopleSoft's HCM Candidate Gateway can take advantage of decoupled systems, with periodic synchronization.

This section provides these examples of dual-stack periodic synchronization:

- » External access using a separate network instance.
- » External access using VPN.


Dual-Stack Periodic Synchronization - Separate Instance for External Access

This example illustrates a dual stack with a complete separate instance for external access. Synchronization can be accomplished by any of the near real-time integration features or in batch mode.




Dual-Stack Periodic Synchronization - External Access Using VPN)

In this example, external access is accomplished by means of VPN. Microsoft Windows provides a VPN client and secure access is relatively straightforward to implement.



Appendix B: Security Building Blocks



Appendix C: Security Hardening Recommendations and IT/Security Check List

This appendix provides a list of security hardening recommendations and a list of security questions and consideration to discuss IT/security team discussion and evaluation.

These lists are not comprehensive and are not intended to replace a comprehensive security audit.

Security Hardening Recommendations for Hosted On-Premise or Cloud based Systems

- » Server room lockdown.
- » Require keycard for entry and exit. Prohibit tailgating.
- » Restrict operating system command line interface or shell access to:
 - » Database servers.
 - » Web servers.
 - » Application servers
- » Database lockdown.
- » <http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/articles/index-087388.html>
- » Transparent data encryption.
- » Use Oracle database encryption for data-at-rest protection. Microsoft has similar functionality for SQL Server.
- » Review features of Oracle Audit Vault, especially for abusive data harvesting.
- » SQL Net traffic encryption.
- » Employ encryption between the application server and the database.
- » JOLT traffic encryption.
- » Employ encryption between the web server and the application server.
- » WebLogic lockdown.
http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E15523_01/core.1111/e12889/infrahard.htm
- » Restrict access to the WebLogic Console.
- » Enable access only when necessary.
- » Consider an ERP firewall.
- » Track user ID access attempts and log “finger print” data, including:
 - » Workstation ID.
 - » User ID.
 - » Real IP address.
 - » User agent.
 - » Referrer name.
- » Separate WebLogic Java container from the HTTP server, installing the HTTP server in DMZ.
- » Use a risk and security analysis server like Oracle Adaptive Access Manager.
- » Firewall and router policies.
- » Implement policies that restrict internal access to only approved web server and proxy addresses, reduced/restricted port 80 enabled or accessible internally.
- » Implement HTTPs by default internally.
- » PeopleSoft supports TLS 1.2
- » Use a server-based virus scanning engine.
 - » The engine should be ICAP v1.0 compatible.

- » For more information, see:
http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E58500_01/pt854pbh1/eng/pt/tmcf/task_EnablingVirusScanning-a47fea.html#topofpage
- » Use software asset management.
- » These systems can retrieve details of software installed on each server/workstation and company owned end user device.
- » Employ workstation lockdown policies to prevent:
 - » Unauthorized installation or unapproved use of USB flash drives.
 - » Installation of unapproved software.
 - » Rogue proxies or TCP/IP traffic sniffers.
- » Policy management of end-user devices to ensure current anti-virus/malware software.
- » Ad-hoc and regular discovery of wireless access points.
- » Address uncontrolled use of cloud storage from inside the firewall.
- » Document protection and inappropriate sharing
- » Use site and web server access protection workstation software, such as McAfee SiteAdvisor
<http://www.mcafee.com/us/products/siteadvisor-enterprise.aspx#vt=vtab-FeaturesBenefits>
- » Browser lockdown by Microsoft policy management to white list approved web servers internally and externally. No local user administrator access.
- » Configure PeopleSoft (or access system) password controls.
- » Evaluate password complexity, length, expiration, allowable consecutive failures, and so on.
- » Ensure node passwords are maximum length and complex.
- » MDM/MAM (Mobile Device Manager and Mobile Application Manager) for mobile device access, especially BYOD (bring your own device).
- » Use robust Kiosk software for common area access to sensitive data.
- » Use SPF/DKIM/DMARC to protect mail servers (phishing protection).
- » Use a URL expander to test “shortened” URL’s.

Discussion Questions for IT/Security Teams

- » Do you encrypt data in the database (data at rest)?
- » Consider PET, TDE, SQL server encryption.
- » Do you use full-transport, browser-to-disk, encryption (data in flight).
- » PeopleSoft supports the following:
 - » Browser-to-web server HTTPs.
 - » Web server-to-servlet HTTPs.
 - » Servlet-to-Tuxedo JOLT encryption.
 - » Tuxedo-to-Oracle database with encrypted NetSQL.
- » How do you protect against abusive or inappropriate access by high privilege DBA's?
 - » Do all DBA's use their own user ID or a common ID for administration?
 - » Oracle Audit Vault, Oracle DB Vault, and other audit products (PeopleSoft, GRC, and so on.)
 - » How quickly can you revoke access for a single user, groups of users, or high privilege users?
- » Do you have a process to run background checks on employees who handle customer data? How often do you run the checks?
- » Confirm that privileges are appropriate for users.
- » How do you protect firewalls, proxies, and IPS/IDS?
 - » Do you have different set of credentials for administrator rights on each?

- 
- » Does your disaster plan have a contingency for when a breach occurs?
 - » Who makes the decisions to lock down systems, turn off web servers?
 - » Oracle Rightnow, Content Management, other process automation
 - » Do you have a disclosure plan and are you prepared for credibility/reputation loss?
Oracle Rightnow, Content Management, other process automation
 - » Have you established Security Processes and a defined review cycle?
Oracle Rightnow, Content Management, other process automation
 - » Do you use Anonymous BIND on exposed LDAP?
 - » Address phishing.


Over the past couple of years, most breaches, including credential harvesting have been the result of a successful phishing attack.

- » Consider a site advisor for content filtering and review the security of your email servers.
- » Consider use of a site advisor “proxy”, which includes web content filtering.
For instance, see document at this secure McAfee shortened URL - <http://mcaf.ee/e9txw>
- » Check your exposure to phishing:
<https://www.phishingscorecard.com/>

Appendix D: Integration Broker Security “Waterfall”

Understanding “Waterfall” User ID Flow in Integration Broker

If access drops through validation, access will use roles of the *default user* on the Anonymous Node, so you must ensure this user has minimal rights.



For more information about PeopleSoft Integration Broker Security, see the documentation for *PeopleTools 8.55: Integration Broker Administration*, “Setting Up Secure Integration Environments”

Appendix E: Setting Up Secure Network Infrastructures

This section discusses several common PeopleSoft system topologies. The system topologies have varying degrees of security, scalability, and availability.

Understanding Network Infrastructure Architecture Topology Examples

Because every site is unique with unique requirements, different parts of the topology will require modification. PeopleSoft consulting can provide that support on a case-by-case basis.

Network Infrastructure Topologies

This section features physical and logical network infrastructure topologies.

Physical Topology The physical topologies in this section illustrate the network hardware components of the infrastructure.

Logical Topology The logical topologies in this section illustrate network software, settings, and configuration of the infrastructure.

The sample topologies in this appendix are intended to provide a starting point for discussion on securing your network infrastructure.

In some diagrams featured in this appendix, a redundant version of the architecture is shown although the redundancy settings of the architecture are not discussed in this document. The redundancy portion of the architecture is discussed in the [Implementing Clustering and High Availability for PeopleSoft](#) Red Paper (Doc ID 612096.1) on the Oracle support web site.

Design Assumptions

The following items are basic design assumptions and policies that should be addressed.

Network Security

- » The system should not have any single point of security failure in the architecture.
- » Some security restrictions will reduce the overall scalability of the system.
- » In most cases, name resolution is done using host files instead of using DNS name resolution.
- » Static routes are used within the system whenever possible.
- » The PeopleSoft system has been placed on the DMZ network.
- » At least one level of NAT is available from outside the network to the web server tier.
- » The architecture assumes the external/internet as well as internal/intranet network to be untrusted, so protection from both the internet and the intranet is needed.
- » The architecture provides at least one extra level of security layer between the DMZ and the internal network. Should the security of the DMZ become compromised, the internal network will still be protected.
- » Each tier in the PeopleSoft Pure Internet Architecture has been leveraged to provide an additional security tier between the outside network and the protected data.
- » PeopleSoft Interaction Hub and Integration Broker calls from inside to outside the DMZ are via a forward proxy.
- » The default policy of firewalls and routers is to deny all.
- » A three-pronged DMZ architecture is used. This has a single point of security failure limitation for the intranet site. Security is restricted to a single site in this version of the document. Disaster recovery over multiple security zones is outside the scope of this red paper. See the Oracle Best Practices for High Availability white paper on the Oracle Technical Network.

See: <http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/features/availability/maa-096107.html>

Network Scalability

- » The system should be able to scale with demand as much as possible without requiring changing the architecture.
- » The system should scale with commodity hardware whenever possible.
- » The system should scale with the most cost-effective solution.

Network Availability

The system should be expandable so that no single point of failure exists in the architecture even though the configuration shown is not the expanded version.

Securing the Web Server Infrastructure

The web server infrastructure topologies discussed in this section are:

- » NAT DMZ network infrastructure.
- » Publicly-addressed DMZ network infrastructure.
- » DMZ network infrastructure with outside/inside firewalls and reverse proxy servers.

NAT DMZ Network Infrastructure

In the NAT DMZ architecture, the DMZ occupies a private and non-routable (RFC 1918) internet address space. The web servers are placed in this private address space in the DMZ. NAT is performed by the firewalls 1 and 2. The load balancers route packets to the web servers on the same network. This configuration can be used only if the DMZ is not shared with non-NAT enabled services, such as IPSec and Kerberos. If these non-NAT enabled services must exist on the DMZ, the Publicly Addressed DMZ architecture from the next section must be used.

Common Elements Used to Describe the NAT DMZ Network Infrastructure

The diagrams in this section include these elements:


Element	Description
ISP provider connections.	Redundant ISP provider connections for high availability.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Router 1• Router 2	Redundant routers to connect to the internet.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Firewall 1• Firewall 2	Redundant three-prong firewalls to perform NAT and connect the corporate network to the DMZ.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Load Balancer 1• Load Balancer 2	Redundant load balancers to load-balance requests to Web Server 1 and Web Server 2.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Load Balancer 3• Load Balancer 4	Redundant load balancers to load-balance outbound PIA requests to Forward Proxy 1 and Forward Proxy 2.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Load Balancer 5• Load Balancer 6	(Optional) Load balancers used by Application Servers 1-4 to communicate to LDAP Server 1 and LDAP Server 2 for PIA authentication.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Forward Proxy 1	These proxies isolate the internal address structure from public address.



Element	Description
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Forward Proxy 2	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Web Server 1• Web Server 2	Web servers that communicate to Application Servers 1-4.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Application Server 1• Application Server 2• Application Server 3• Application Server 4	(Optional). These application servers could use Load Balancer 5 and Load Balancer 6 to communicate to LDAP Server 1 and LDAP Server 2 for PIA authentication. These application servers communicate with Clustered Database Server 1 and Clustered Database Server 2.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• LDAP Server 1• LDAP Server 2	LDAP servers with RAID storage for fault tolerance. Each server has its own RAID storage.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Clustered Database Server 1• Clustered Database Server 2	Clustered database servers that share RAID storage for fault tolerance.


Sample Physical Topology – NAT DMZ Network Infrastructure

This diagram shows a sample physical topology of an NAT DMZ network infrastructure:



Sample Logical Topology – NAT DMZ Network Infrastructure

This diagram illustrates a sample logical topology of an NAT DMZ network infrastructure:



Sample Configuration Parameters for the NAT DMZ Network Infrastructure

This section describes sample configuration parameters for the NAT DMZ network infrastructure, and are for illustration purposes only.

Router Setup

Unit	Router 1 (Active)	Router 2 (Standby)
IP Address	123.123.123.2	123.123.123.3
Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Packet filters (only if available)	Allow only HTTP/HTTPS access the PeopleSoft system. If the PeopleSoft portal is to call outside, then allow HTTP/HTTPS from the PeopleSoft system. Allow rules as needed by other non-PeopleSoft systems.	Same as Unit 1.

Firewall Setup

Unit	Firewall 1 (Active)	Firewall 2 (Active)
IP Address 1	123.123.123.6	123.123.123.7
Subnet Mask 1	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address 1	123.123.123.5	123.123.123.5
Default Route 1	123.123.123.1	123.123.123.1
IP Address 2	10.0.0.2	10.0.0.3
Subnet Mask 2	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address 2	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1
Default Route 2	None	None
IP Address 3	*	*
Subnet Mask 3	*	*
Shared Address 3	*	*
Default Route 3	None	None

* Based on the intranet IP address, it can be RFC 1918 address space.

Note. Both firewall units have the same security setup.

Access to PIA/Portal from Outside

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
HTTP	TCP	Any	80	123.123.123.100	80	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	Any	443	123.123.123.100	443	Allow

Access to Outside from Portal/Application Messaging Service

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
HTTP	TCP	10.0.0.50	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	10.0.0.50	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTP	TCP	10.0.0.60	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	10.0.0.60	Any	Any	Any	Allow

Access to Provider's DNS Server from Local DNS Server

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
DNS1	UDP	Local DNS	Any	Provider's DNS	53	Allow
DNS1	TCP	Local DNS	Any	Provider's DNS	53	Allow

Do not allow the reverse path. For example, do not allow the provider's DNS updates to reach local DNS

Static Address Mapping for Inbound Firewall NAT

External IP Address	Transport Protocol	External Port	Internal Address	Internal Port
123.123.123.100	TCP	80	10.0.0.100	80
123.123.123.100	TCP	443	10.0.0.100	443

Static Address Mapping for Outbound Firewall Reverse NAT

Source IP	Transport Protocol	Source Port	Translated IP	Translated Port
10.0.0.50	TCP	Any	123.123.123.50	Any
10.0.0.60	TCP	Any	123.123.123.60	Any

Web Server Setup

The configuration parameters vary based on the web server clustering scheme that you select. Refer to the [Implementing Clustering and High Availability for PeopleSoft Red Paper](#) (Doc ID 612096.1) on the Oracle support web site for more information.

Unit	WebHost1:Instance1	WebHost1:Instance2	WebHost2:Instance1	WebHost2:Instance2
IP Address 1	*	*	*	*
Subnet Mask 1	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Default Route 1	10.0.0.5	10.0.0.5	10.0.0.5	10.0.0.5
HTTP Port	*	*	*	*



HTTPS Port	*	*	*	*
IP Address 2	10.0.1.10	10.0.1.10	10.0.1.20	10.0.1.20
Subnet Mask 2	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Default Route 2 ¹	10.0.1.50	10.0.1.50	10.0.1.50	10.0.1.50

* See the [Implementing Clustering and High Availability for PeopleSoft](#) Red Paper (Doc ID 612096.1) for values.

¹ Set to none if proxy load balancing is not used

Web Server Load Balancer Setup

Unit	Load Balancer 1 (Active)	Load Balancer 2 (Standby)
IP Address	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7
Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address	10.0.0.5	10.0.0.5
Default Route	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1
Virtual IP (portal.corp.com)	10.0.0.100	10.0.0.100
HTTP Service Port	80	80
HTTPS Service Port	443	443
HTTP Persistence (sticky)	Load balancer cookie	Load balancer cookie
HTTPS Persistence (sticky)	Load balancer SSL sticky	Load balancer SSL sticky

Forward Proxy Setup

This is an optional setup for Portal, Application Messaging, and Business Interlinks outbound calls.

Unit	ForwardProxy1	ForwardProxy2
IP Address 1	10.0.0.50	10.0.0.60
Subnet Mask 1	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Default Route 1	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1
IP Address 2	10.0.1.51	10.0.1.52
Subnet Mask 2	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Default Route 2	10.0.0.50	10.0.0.60
HTTP Port	80	80
HTTPS Port	443	443

Forward Proxy Load Balancer Setup

This is an optional setup for PeopleSoft Interaction Hub and PeopleSoft Integration Broker outbound calls.

Unit	Load Balancer 3 (Active)	Load Balancer 4 (Standby)
IP Address	10.0.1.2	10.0.1.3
Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address	10.0.1.1	10.0.1.1
Default Route	None	None
Virtual IP for Proxy Service	10.0.1.50	10.0.1.50
HTTP Service Port	80	80
HTTPS Service Port	443	443
Persistence (sticky)	IP Based	IP-based

Application Server Setup (Sample Configuration)

Unit	AppHost1:Domain1	AppHost1:Domain2	AppHost2:Domain1	AppHost2:Domain2
IP Address 1	10.0.1.100	10.0.1.100	10.0.1.110	10.0.1.110
Subnet Mask 1	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Default Route 1	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1
JSH Port	9000	9020	9000	9020
IP Address 2	10.0.2.10	10.0.2.10	10.0.2.20	10.0.2.20
Subnet Mask 2	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Default Route 1	10.0.0.5	10.0.0.5	10.0.0.5	10.0.0.5
LDAP Host	10.0.2.50	10.0.2.50	10.0.2.50	10.0.2.50
LDAP Port	389	389	389	389
LDAPS Port	636	636	636	636

LDAP Load Balancer Setup (Sample Configuration)

This is an optional setup for LDAP load balancing.

Unit	Load Balancer 5 (Active)	Load Balancer 6 (Standby)
IP Address	10.0.2.2	10.0.2.3
Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address	10.0.2.1	10.0.2.1
Default Route	None	None
Virtual IP for Proxy Service	10.0.2.50	10.0.2.50
LDAP Service Port	389	389



Unit	Load Balancer 5 (Active)	Load Balancer 6 (Standby)
LDAPS Service Port	636	636
Persistence (sticky)	IP Based	IP Based

Database Server Setup

Unit	DBServer1	DBServer2
IP Address	10.0.2.70	10.0.2.80
Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Default Route	None	None
Service VIP ¹	10.0.2.60	10.0.2.60
Service Port	DB Vendor Specific	DB Vendor Specific

¹ Required only if database is clustered.

Publicly-Addressed DMZ Network Infrastructure

In a publicly-addressed DMZ network architecture, the DMZ occupies a publicly addressable IP address space. The load balancers perform NAT and pass packets to the web servers that reside in a private and non-routable (RFC 1918) internet address space.

This configuration should be used if the DMZ has to be shared with non-NAT enable services, such as IPSec and Kerberos.

The diagrams in this section show only the modified portion of the infrastructure. The application and database servers in the infrastructure are the same as the NAT DMZ infrastructure and are not shown.

Common Elements Used to Describe the Publicly-Addressed DMZ Network Infrastructure


The diagrams in this section feature these elements:

Element	Description
ISP provider connections.	Redundant ISP provider connections for high availability.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">Router 1Router 2	Redundant routers to connect to the internet.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">Firewall 1Firewall 2	Redundant three-prong firewalls to perform NAT and connect the corporate network to the DMZ.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Load Balancer 1 • Load Balancer 2 	Redundant load balancers to load-balance requests to Web Server 1 and Web Server 2.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Load Balancer 3 • Load Balancer 4 	Redundant load balancers to load-balance outbound PIA requests to Forward Proxy 1 and Forward Proxy 2.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Web Server 1 • Web Server 2 	Web servers that communicate to Application Servers 1-4.


Sample Physical Topology- Publicly-Addressed DMZ Network Infrastructure

This diagram illustrates a sample physical topology of a publicly-addressed DMZ network infrastructure:



Sample Logical Topology

This diagram illustrates a sample logical topology of a publicly-addressed DMZ network infrastructure:



Sample Configuration Parameters for the NAT DMZ Network Infrastructure

This section describes sample configuration parameters for the NAT DMZ network infrastructure, and are for illustration purposes only.

Router Setup

Unit	Router 1 (Active)	Router 2 (Standby)
IP Address	123.123.122.2	123.123.122.3
Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Packet filters (only if available)	Allow only HTTP/HTTPS to the PeopleSoft system. If the PeopleSoft portal is to call outside, allow HTTP/HTTPS to outside from the PeopleSoft system. Allow rules as needed by other non-PeopleSoft systems.	Same as Unit 1.

Firewall Setup

Unit	Firewall 1 (Active)	Firewall 2 (Active)
IP Address 1	123.123.122.6	123.123.122.7
Subnet Mask 1	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address 1	123.123.122.5	123.123.122.5
Default Route 1	123.123.122.1	123.123.122.1
IP Address 2	123.123.123.2	123.123.123.3
Subnet Mask 2	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address 2	123.123.123.1	123.123.123.1
Default Route 2	None	None
IP Address 3	*	*
Subnet Mask 3	*	*
Shared Address 3	*	*
Default Route 3	None	None

* Based on the intranet IP address, it can be the RFC 1918 address space.

Note: Both firewall units have the same security setup.

Access to PIA/Portal from Outside

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
HTTP	TCP	Any	80	123.123.123.100	80	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	Any	443	123.123.123.100	443	Allow

Access to Outside from Portal/Application Messaging Service

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
HTTP	TCP	123.123.123.50	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	123.123.123.50	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTP	TCP	123.123.123.60	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	123.123.123.60	Any	Any	Any	Allow

Access to Provider's DNS Server from Local DNS Server

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
DNS ¹	UDP	Local DNS	Any	Provider's DNS	53	Allow
DNS ¹	TCP	Local DNS	Any	Provider's DNS	53	Allow

¹ Do not allow the reverse path. For example, do not allow the provider's DNS updates to reach the local DNS.

Web Server Load Balancer Setup

Unit	Load Balancer 1 (Active)	Load Balancer 2 (Standby)
IP Address (VLAN1/0)	123.123.123.6	123.123.123.7
Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address	123.123.123.5	123.123.123.5
Default Route	123.123.123.1	123.123.123.1
IP Address (VLAN1/1)	10.0.0.2	10.0.0.3
Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1
Virtual IP (portal.corp.com)	123.123.123.100	123.123.123.100
HTTP Service Port	80	80
HTTPS Service Port	443	443
HTTP Persistence (sticky)	Load Balancer Cookie	Load Balancer Cookie
HTTPS Persistence (sticky)	Load Balancer SSL Sticky	Load Balancer SSL Sticky

Static Address Mapping for Inbound Load Balancer NAT

External IP Address	Transport Protocol	External Port	Internal Address	Internal Port
123.123.123.100	TCP	80	10.0.0.100	80
123.123.123.100	TCP	443	10.0.0.100	443

Static Address Mapping for Outbound Load Balancer Reverse NAT

Source IP	Transport Protocol	Source Port	Translated IP	Translated Port
10.0.0.50	TCP	Any	123.123.123.50	Any
10.0.0.60	TCP	Any	123.123.123.60	Any

Web Server Setup

The configuration parameters vary based on the web server clustering scheme selected.

Unit	WebHost1:Instance1	WebHost1:Instance2	WebHost2:Instance1	WebHost2:Instance2
IP Address 1	*	*	*	*
Subnet Mask 1	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Default Route 1	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1
HTTP Port	*	*	*	*
HTTPS Port	*	*	*	*
IP Address 2	10.0.1.10	10.0.1.10	10.0.1.20	10.0.1.20
Subnet Mask 2	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
DefaultRoute 2 ¹	10.0.1.50	10.0.1.50	10.0.1.50	10.0.1.50

* See *Clustering and High Availability of PeopleSoft 8.4* red paper available on Customer Connection for values.

DMZ Network Infrastructure with Outside/Inside Firewalls and Reverse Proxy Servers

For a DMZ with higher security, use an architecture that consists of an outside firewall, an inside firewall, and a reverse proxy server (RPS). Ideally, the firewalls should be of a different model or made to maintain diversity in the architecture.

The inside firewalls should allow HTTP/HTTPS requests to originate only from the reverse proxy server and terminate on the web servers.


Requests from users to the reverse proxy servers are load balanced by reverse proxy server load balancers A and B inside the DMZ, and requests from the reverse proxy servers to web servers are load balanced by load balancers 1 and 2. On the diagram, everything under the DMZ is the same as described in the previous examples.

Common Elements Used to Describe the DMZ network Infrastructure with Outside/Inside Firewalls and Reverse Proxy Servers

Element	Description
ISP provider connections.	Redundant ISP provider connections for high availability.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Router 1• Router 2	Redundant routers to connect to the internet.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Firewall A• Firewall B	Redundant three-prong firewalls to perform NAT and connect the corporate network to the DMZ.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Firewall 1• Firewall 2	Redundant inside firewall 1 and inside firewall 2 that provide additional security by moving web server 1 and web server 2 away from the DMZ.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Load Balancer A• Load Balancer B	Redundant load balancers A and B to load-balance requests to reverse proxy server 1 and reverse proxy server 2.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Load Balancer 1• Load Balancer 2	Redundant load balancer 1 and load balancer 2 that load-balance requests from reverse proxy server 1 and reverse proxy server 2 to web server 1 and web server 2.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Web Server 1• Web Server 2	Web servers 1 and 2 that communicate to application servers and forward proxy servers not shown in the diagram.


Sample Physical Topology – DMZ Network Infrastructure with Outside/Inside Firewalls and Reverse Proxy Servers

The following diagram illustrates a sample physical topology of the DMZ network infrastructure with an outside firewall, and inside firewall, and a reverse proxy server:



Sample Logical Topology

The following diagram illustrates a sample logical topology of the DMZ network infrastructure with an outside firewall, and inside firewall, and a reverse proxy server:



Sample Configuration Parameters for the DMZ Network Infrastructure with Outside/Inside Firewalls and Reverse Proxy Servers

This section describes sample configuration parameters for the DMZ network infrastructure with outside/inside firewalls and reverse proxy server and are for illustration purposes only.

Router Setup

Unit	Router 1 (Active)	Router 2 (Standby)
IP Address	123.123.122.2	123.123.122.3
Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
VRRP IP Address	123.123.122.1	123.123.122.1
VRRP Priority	200	100
Packet filters (only if available)	Allow only HTTP/HTTPS to the PeopleSoft system. If the PeopleSoft portal is to call outside, allow HTTP/HTTPS to outside from the PeopleSoft system. Allow rules as needed by other non-PeopleSoft systems.	Same as Unit 1.

Outside Firewall Setup

Unit	Firewall A (Active)	Firewall B (Active)
IP Address 1	123.123.122.6	123.123.122.7
Subnet Mask 1	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address 1	123.123.122.5	123.123.122.5
Default Route 1	123.123.122.1	123.123.122.1
IP Address 2	123.123.123.2	123.123.123.3
Subnet Mask 2	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address 2	123.123.123.1	123.123.123.1
Default Route 2	None	None
IP Address 3	*	*
Subnet Mask 3	*	*
Shared Address 3	*	*
Default Route 3	None	None

* Based on the intranet IP address, it can be the RFC 1918 address space.

Note. Both firewall units have the same security setup.

Access to PIA/Portal from Outside

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
HTTP	TCP	Any	80	123.123.123.100	80	Allow



Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
HTTPS	TCP	Any	443	123.123.123.100	443	Allow

Access to Outside from Portal/Application Messaging Service

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
HTTP	TCP	123.123.123.50	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	123.123.123.50	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTP	TCP	123.123.123.60	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	123.123.123.60	Any	Any	Any	Allow

Access to Provider's DNS Server from Local DNS Server

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
DNS ¹	UDP	Local DNS	Any	Provider's DNS	53	Allow
DNS ¹	TCP	Local DNS	Any	Provider's DNS	53	Allow

¹ Do not allow the reverse path. For example, do not allow a provider's DNS updates to reach the local DNS.

Reverse Proxy Server Load Balancer Setup

Unit	Load Balancer A (Active)	Load Balancer B (Standby)
IP Address	123.123.123.6	123.123.123.7
Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address	123.123.123.5	123.123.123.5
Default Route	123.123.123.1	123.123.123.1
Virtual IP (portal.corp.com)	123.123.123.100	123.123.123.100
HTTP Service Port	80	80
HTTPS Service Port	443	443
HTTP Persistence (sticky)	Load Balancer Cookie	Load Balancer Cookie
HTTPS Persistence (sticky)	Load Balancer SSL Sticky	Load Balancer SSL Sticky

Reverse Proxy Server Setup

Unit	RPS1	RPS2
IP Address 1	123.123.123.50	123.123.123.60
Subnet Mask 1	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Default Route 1	123.123.123.5	123.123.123.5
HTTP Port	80	80
HTTPS Port	443	443

Inside Firewall Setup

Unit	Firewall 1 (Active)	Firewall 2 (Active)
IP Address 1	123.123.123.16	123.123.123.17
Subnet Mask 1	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address 1	123.123.123.15	123.123.123.15
Default Route 1	123.123.123.1	123.123.123.1
IP Address 2	10.0.0.2	10.0.0.3
Subnet Mask 2	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address 2	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1
Default Route 2	None	None

Note. Both firewall units have the same security setup.

Access to PIA/Portal from RPS Only

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
HTTP	TCP	123.123.123.50	80	10.0.0.100	80	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	123.123.123.50	443	10.0.0.100	443	Allow
HTTP	TCP	123.123.123.60	80	10.0.0.100	80	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	123.123.123.60	443	10.0.0.100	443	Allow

Access to Outside from Portal/Application Messaging Service

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
HTTP	TCP	10.0.0.50	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	10.0.0.50	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTP	TCP	10.0.0.60	Any	Any	Any	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	10.0.0.60	Any	Any	Any	Allow

Static Address Mapping on Inside Firewall for Inbound NAT

External IP Address	Transport Protocol	External Port	Internal Address	Internal Port
123.123.123.100	TCP	80	10.0.0.100	80
123.123.123.100	TCP	443	10.0.0.100	443

Static Address Mapping on Inside Firewall for Outbound Reverse NAT

Source IP	Transport Protocol	Source Port	Translated IP	Translated Port
10.0.0.50	TCP	Any	123.123.123.50	Any
10.0.0.60	TCP	Any	123.123.123.60	Any

Web Server Load Balancer Setup

Unit	Load Balancer 1 (Active)	Load Balancer 2 (Standby)
IP Address	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7
Subnet Mask	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address	10.0.0.5	10.0.0.5
Default Route	10.0.0.1	10.0.0.1
Virtual IP (portal.corp.com)	10.0.0.100	10.0.0.100
HTTP Service Port	80	80
HTTPS Service Port	443	443
HTTP Persistence (sticky)	Load Balancer Cookie	Load Balancer Cookie
HTTPS Persistence (sticky)	Load Balancer SSL Sticky	Load Balancer SSL Sticky

Web Server Setup

All other setup, including web server setup, is the same as the NAT DMZ configuration.

Securing Firewall Application Servers

After the web server has been adequately secured by one of the setups described earlier, a firewall can be used between the web server and the application server for additional security. In the topology described in this section, Firewall C and Firewall D are added for this purpose. The new firewall policies allow JOLT requests to originate from the web servers only. Additionally, all outbound requests to the forward proxy server are limited to HTTP/HTTPS and can only originate from one of the application servers. No other outbound/inbound requests are allowed.



Common Elements Used to Describe Securing Firewall Application Servers


The diagrams in this section feature these elements:

Element	Description
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Firewall C• Firewall D	Redundant inside firewalls C and D that provide additional security by separating application servers 1 through 4 from web servers 1 and 2
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Load Balancer 3• Load Balancer 4	Redundant load balancers 3 and 4 load-balance requests from application servers 1 through 4 to forward proxy servers 1 and 2 via inside firewalls C and D.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Forward Proxy 1• Forward Proxy 2	These proxies isolate the internal address structure from public address.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Web Server 1• Web Server 2	Web servers that communicate to Application Servers 1-4.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Application Server 1• Application Server 2• Application Server 3• Application Server 4	These application servers communicate to database servers not shown in the diagram.

There is additional architecture not shown in the diagrams to communicate to web server 1 and web server 2.


Sample Physical Topology

This diagram illustrates an example physical topology for securing firewall application servers:



Sample Logical Topology

This diagram illustrates a sample logical topology of securing firewall application servers:



Sample Configuration Parameters for Securing Firewall Application Servers

This section describes sample configuration parameters for securing firewall application servers, and are for illustration purposes only.

Application Server Firewall Setup

Unit	Firewall C (Active)	Firewall D (Active)
IP Address 1	10.0.1.6	10.0.1.7
Subnet Mask 1	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address 1	10.0.1.5	10.0.1.5
Default Route 1	10.0.1.11	10.0.1.11

IP Address 2	10.1.1.2	10.1.1.3
Subnet Mask 2	255.255.255.0	255.255.255.0
Shared Address 2	10.1.1.1	10.1.1.1
Default Route 2	None	None

Access to Application Server from Web Server Only

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
JOLT	TCP	10.0.1.10	Any	10.1.1.100	*	Allow
JOLT	TCP	10.0.1.20	Any	10.1.1.100	*	Allow
JOLT	TCP	10.0.1.10	Any	10.1.1.110	*	Allow
JOLT	TCP	10.0.1.20	Any	10.1.1.110	*	Allow
JOLT	TCP	10.0.1.10	Any	10.1.1.120	*	Allow
JOLT	TCP	10.0.1.20	Any	10.1.1.120	*	Allow
JOLT	TCP	10.0.1.10	Any	10.1.1.130	*	Allow
JOLT	TCP	10.0.1.20	Any	10.1.1.130	*	Allow

* This is a port range starting from the JOLT listener port number up to the total number of handlers. For example, if the JOLT listener is 9000 and five (5) JOLT handlers exist, the port range to allow is 9000–9005. If a JOLT relay is used, then allow the JOLT relay port rather than the port range for each server.

Access to Outside from Application Messaging Service

Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
HTTP	TCP	10.1.1.100	Any	10.0.1.50	Proxy HTTP Port (7080)	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	10.1.1.100	Any	10.0.1.50	Proxy HTTPS Port (7443)	Allow
HTTP	TCP	10.1.1.110	Any	10.0.1.50	Proxy HTTP Port (7080)	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	10.1.1.110	Any	10.0.1.50	Proxy HTTPS Port (7443)	Allow
HTTP	TCP	10.1.1.120	Any	10.0.1.50	Proxy HTTP Port (7080)	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	10.1.1.120	Any	10.0.1.50	Proxy HTTPS Port (7443)	Allow
HTTP	TCP	10.1.1.130	Any	10.0.1.50	Proxy HTTP Port (7080)	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	10.1.1.130	Any	10.0.1.50	Proxy HTTPS Port (7443)	Allow



Protocol	Transport Protocol	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	Action
HTTP	TCP	10.1.1.140	Any	10.0.1.50	Proxy HTTP Port (7080)	Allow
HTTPS	TCP	10.1.1.140	Any	10.0.1.50	Proxy HTTPS Port (7443)	Allow



Validation and Feedback

This section documents the real-world validation that this red paper has received.

Customer Validation

Oracle is working with PeopleSoft customers to get feedback and validation on this document. Lessons that are learned from these customer experiences will be posted here.

Field Validation

Oracle Consulting Services has provided feedback and validation on this document. Additional lessons that are learned from field experience will be posted here.

Revision History

Date	Change
December 2004	Version 1
July 2010	Version 2
October 2016	Version 3



Oracle Corporation, World Headquarters

500 Oracle Parkway
Redwood Shores, CA 94065, USA

Worldwide Inquiries

Phone: +1.650.506.7000
Fax: +1.650.506.7200

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-  blogs.oracle.com/oracle
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Author: [OPTIONAL]
Contributing Authors: [OPTIONAL]

